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Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts, or to abolish
distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so
can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation.1
[G]roup relations have been the last fortress of the doctrine of
laissez faire. Long after resort to legislation to curb existing evils had
been taken for granted, the theory survived that discrimination was not
susceptible to this treatment. The past decade has given the death blow
to that theory.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Brown v. Board of Education3 emerged from a constellation of assumptions
about race and law, the contours of which have yet to be fully reconstructed. We
are familiar with the efforts of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) and their allies to attack the belief, infamously espoused
in Plessy v. Ferguson,4 that segregation imposed no necessary badge of inferiority
on African Americans.5 Familiar, too, is the growing recognition by the middle of
the twentieth century of the importance of education to modern American society,
a factor Chief Justice Earl Warren highlighted in the Brown opinion.6 And recently
scholars have drawn attention to the critical role of Cold War foreign policy in
creating pressure for civil rights reform.7 But there was another issue that
permeated the intellectual landscape during the early post–World War II period in
which Brown was born that has largely been overlooked in the scholarship:
whether law even had the power to affect the racial prejudice that motivated the
practices and customs of white supremacy in the Jim Crow era. Without a
commitment to the belief that the guiding hand of the law had the capacity to
weaken racial animosity, much of the nascent civil rights project threatened to
dissolve. A critical factor in the emergence of civil rights as a viable national issue
was the work of activists, lawyers, and scholars who pressed upon the nation their
faith in the efficacy of civil rights reform.
As the United States emerged from World War II, the battle over the
fundamental wrongness of racial segregation, while far from over, was well on its
way toward resolution. The real question for the nation was not whether the nation
1

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
Will Maslow & Joseph B. Robison, Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for
Equality, 1862–1952, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 413 (1953).
3
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5
Id. at 551.
6
347 U.S. at 492–93.
7
See, e.g., MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN D EMOCRACY 79–115 (2000).
2
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would be better off, from the perspective of morality, economics, and world
opinion, without Jim Crow, but the best way to achieve this desired end. Since the
late nineteenth century, most Americans agreed that racial progress would be
achieved by education rather than legislation. Improving race relations required
attacking prejudicial attitudes rather than discriminatory actions—the logic being
that the latter was only the product of the former. In the years leading up to Brown,
a pervasive, commonplace argument against civil rights legislation and judicial
rulings was that beliefs, not laws, dictated behavior. This was the assumption of
the Plessy Court—that laws were “powerless to eradicate racial instincts” and
“social prejudices.”8 This was the claim captured in the popular dictum put forth
by Yale University sociologist William Graham Sumner, which encapsulated the
prevalent social-Darwinist assumption of the Jim Crow era, that “stateways” were
powerless to change “folkways.”9 The lessons of history seemed only to confirm
these assumptions. Post–Civil War efforts to promote equality for the freed slaves
resulted in a “tragic era”10 of Reconstruction, demonstrating that civil rights laws,
even when backed by military force, were ultimately ineffectual in cracking the
white South’s deep commitment to racial supremacy. And the embarrassing
experience of Prohibition, the “noble experiment” of banning alcohol that the
nation abandoned in 1933, fourteen years after it began, only strengthened the
claim that laws were powerless, even counterproductive, when placed in
opposition to entrenched customs.
In an effort to overcome these pessimistic assumptions toward the law, in the
1940s and 1950s a generation of liberal social scientists, historians, and lawyers
rallied around a new approach. Change the laws, racial liberals argued, and
attitudes and customs will follow. The prejudices that pulled the races apart were
not particularly deep-seated; indeed, they were themselves the product of laws that
required the separation of the races. Remove legal barriers preventing blacks and
whites from living and working together, and they will begin to understand each
other; proximity encouraged by legal compulsion can lead to tolerance. Law, they
emphasized, involved more than enforcement, more than the raw application of
power; it also involved moral leadership and education. As the nation emerged
from the war years, racial liberals optimistically saw the country as poised to
squarely address its increasingly embarrassing and anachronistic racial practices,
and, in such a climate, legal reform would prove to be the critical next step. In
short, prohibit discrimination, and race relations will improve. Guided by carefully
considered legal reform, postwar racial liberals envisioned a new era in race
relations, driven by the nation’s basic commitment to the principle of equality, now
released from the shackles of Jim Crow laws. “Freedom comes only from the law,”
8

163 U.S. at 551.
WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL
IMPORTANCE OF USAGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES, AND MORALS 77–78 (Ginn &
Company 1940) (1906).
10
See CLAUDE G. BOWERS, THE TRAGIC ERA: THE REVOLUTION AFTER LINCOLN
(1929).
9
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proclaimed legal scholar and civil rights activist Milton Konvitz,11 thus
summarizing an essential tenet of postwar racial liberalism.
This vision of the capacity of the law—a mixture of insight and inspiration,
analysis and hopeful thinking—was remarkably compelling for many Americans at
midcentury. In one form or another, the belief that civil rights law could eradicate
prejudice, and do so in relatively short order, would be internalized by a growing
number of reformers and policymakers. Yet, as the principle of civil rights gained
strength, considerable skepticism remained about whether judicial leadership in the
area of civil rights could be effective. When the judiciary served its paradigmatic
role of protecting minority rights against majority interests—a role the Supreme
Court embraced with increasing seriousness during these years—it necessarily
tested the power of the law to uproot entrenched customs. For the Supreme Court
to strike down Jim Crow laws would be the most direct test of the racial liberal
claims about the efficacy of civil rights law. The newly emergent confidence in
law played a prominent role in swaying several members of the Supreme Court, in
1954, to refute the assumptions on which Plessy was based and hold racial
segregation in schools unconstitutional.12
This Article makes several contributions to legal scholarship. Most
importantly, it brings to light a factor in the emergence of the civil rights
revolution of the 1950s and 1960s that has largely been forgotten. The widespread
acceptance of the legalist arguments was a necessary step in the creation of the
modern concept of civil rights, which is based on the faith that legal institutions—
particularly the federal courts—should be at the center of the struggle for racial
equality. The allure of this distinctly modern faith in civil rights law was an
important factor in the decline of alternative approaches to dealing with racial
inequality, including reform efforts that put more emphasis on economic and
structural inequality.13 Furthermore, a deeper appreciation for the importance of
the debate over the capacity of the law in the early postwar period highlights the
interrelations between the efforts to create support for federal civil rights law and
the previous achievements of the New Deal, as well as the significant civil rights
efforts taking place on the state and local level during these years. Postwar racial
liberals looked to all these sources in making their case for the law.
My analysis also adds to our understanding of historical developments since
Brown. For example, by appreciating the effort that went into the pre-Brown
campaign to make a case for the power of law, we can better understand the
remarkable optimism that accompanied the Supreme Court’s decision. After
spending years trying to convince policymakers and judges that civil rights law
was the key to moving beyond Jim Crow, and that the South was ready to accept
11

MILTON R. K ONVITZ, THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS viii (1947).
See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
13
See, e.g., RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007); Robert
Korstad & Nelson Lichtenstein, Opportunities Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and the
Early Civil Rights Movement, 75 J. A M. HIST. 786 (1988); Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking
Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256 (2005).
12
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legal change, there was a sense among civil rights lawyers, activists, and many
government officials (including a majority of Supreme Court Justices) that with
Brown the major battle had been won. Even when the Court issued its 1955
implementation decision (Brown II),14 with its instruction to desegregate “with all
deliberate speed,”15 true believers in the racial liberal position were undeterred. “I
think it’s a damned good decision!” Thurgood Marshall pronounced after Brown
II.16 “[T]he laws have got to yield! They’ve got to yield to the Constitution.”17 But
Marshall (along with many other racial liberals) was overly optimistic, as the rise
of massive resistance in the wake of Brown II would attest. This was the doubleedged sword of the deep faith in the capacity of the law: it was an essential part of
the civil rights reform efforts of the 1945–1955 period, but it also risked pulling
attention away from the grassroots struggles that would be necessary to translate
legal mandates into social reality.
Finally, this Article provides a missing element in the history of the ongoing
debate over the role of the courts in social change. The prevalent faith in the courts
as the leading edge of reform—what Laura Kalman has termed “legal
liberalism”18—has too often been attributed to Brown itself.19 But I argue that legal
liberalism was not the product of Brown; rather, Brown was the product of legal
liberalism. It took at least a decade of activism, scholarship, and litigation to
construct and promulgate racial liberal ideology, and it was the persuasive power
of this ideology that made Brown possible. In illuminating the lost history of the
postwar debate over the capacity of the law to affect race relations, this Article
provides a more complete lineage of legal liberalism.
This Article is divided into four main sections. Part II examines the belief,
prevalent in the late nineteenth century, that laws were of limited efficacy in
challenging racial hierarchies, and the continued vitality of this concept in the first
half of the twentieth century. Part III describes the efforts of social scientists and
historians in the early postwar period to refute the legal skeptics and construct a
new vision of the law as uniquely effective at reforming entrenched social patterns
and racial prejudices. Part IV turns to Brown, describing the application of these
new arguments for the capacity of the law by NAACP lawyers, the efforts to refute
these arguments by their opponents, and the Supreme Court Justices’ receptivity to
the legalist arguments. Part V examines the resurgence, in the wake of widespread
resistance to Brown in the South, of a more circumspect vision of civil rights law.
Disappointment at Brown’s failure to move the South to abandon segregation was
14

Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Id. at 301.
16
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK A MERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 746 (1976) (quoting
Marshall in transcribed conversation with Carl Murphy).
17
Id. at 747.
18
LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 2 (1996).
19
Id.; see also Mack, supra note 13, at 265 (“The legal liberal interpretation of civil
rights lawyering and politics emerged only after the apparent success of a particular mode
of civil rights lawyering in the Brown litigation.”).
15
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a critical contributing factor in the emergence of a movement of direct-action
protest against Jim Crow, a movement driven by the belief that legal proclamations
alone would not change society.
II. “FOLKWAYS ” AND “STATEWAYS” IN THE J IM CROW ERA
A. The Folkways Principle Defined
Civil rights advocates in the middle decades of the twentieth century who
looked back at the late-nineteenth-century birth moment of Jim Crow America
were invariably drawn to two statements that seemed to encapsulate that era’s
pessimistic, fatalistic vision toward civil rights reform. One was a dictum put forth
by Yale University professor William Graham Sumner, which captured the
prevalent social-Darwinist assumptions of the day: “Stateways,” he declared, were
powerless to change “folkways.”20 The other was the language found in the
majority opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, in which the Court expressed skepticism
toward civil rights laws that conflicted with society’s natural racial prejudices. 21
The Plessy decision of 1896 offered one of the most famous articulations of
the principle against which mid-twentieth-century racial liberals fought.
“Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts, or to abolish distinctions
based upon physical differences,” the Court explained in upholding a Louisiana
railroad segregation statute, “and the attempt to do so can only result in
accentuating the difficulties of the present situation.”22 The Court further stated
that the belief “that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that
equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except by enforced commingling of the
two races” was deeply misguided.23
The object of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment was undoubtedly to
enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but, in the
nature of things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions
based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political,
equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to
either . . . .
....
. . . If one race be inferior to the other socially, the constitution of
the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.24
This skepticism toward improving race relations through the force of law
reinforced the Court’s narrow vision of the Fourteenth Amendment that allowed
20

See SUMNER, supra note 9.
163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 544, 552.
21
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states broad discretion in aligning racially discriminatory laws with local customs.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the only relevant concern for the Court was
whether the law was reasonable, and “[i]n determining the question of
reasonableness, it is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages,
customs, and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their
comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order.”25 Social change,
if it were to arrive, would do so through pressures other than legal compulsion. “If
the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of
natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other’s merits, and a voluntary
consent of individuals.”26 Plessy is pervaded with a general skepticism toward the
power of the law to effect change in the “social” sphere.27
In many ways, Plessy was unexceptional for its day, both in the legal standard
established and in the ideological commitments on which the Court relied.28 In
dismissing civil rights policy as ill-advised intervention into relationships that were
best regulated by prevailing local norms and customs, the Court drew upon a
widely held assumption of the period. The majority opinion quoted from a decision
of the New York Court of Appeals, People ex rel. King v. Gallagher (1883), which
concluded that social equality “can neither be accomplished nor promoted by laws
which conflict with the general sentiment of the community upon whom they are
designed to operate.”29 New York’s highest court argued (in a section not quoted in
Plessy):
In the nature of things there must be many social distinctions and
privileges remaining unregulated by law and left within the control of the
individual citizens, as being beyond the reach of the legislative functions
of government to organize or control. The attempt to enforce social
intimacy and intercourse between the races, by legal enactments, would
probably tend only to embitter the prejudices, if any such there are,
which exist between them, and produce an evil instead of a good result.30
If interracial “intercourse” were to develop, it would only be because of “the
operation of natural laws and the merits of individuals, and [could] exist and be
25

Id. at 550.
Id. at 551.
27
See, e.g., id. at 551 (referring to segregation law as creating “merely a legal
distinction” (emphasis added)).
28
See MICHAEL J. K LARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 8–60 (2004); CHARLES A. LOFGREN,
THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 174–75 (1987). See generally
GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON
AFRO-A MERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817–1914, at 275–82 (1971) (describing
surge in racist thought and violence at the turn of the twentieth century).
29
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551 (quoting People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 448
(1883)).
30
People ex rel. King, 93 N.Y. at 448.
26
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enjoyed only by the voluntary consent of the persons between whom such relations
[might] arise.”31 Five years later, the same New York court reiterated its skeptical
view of the law when placed in opposition to entrenched racial custom. In the
process of upholding a state public accommodation law, it emphasized the point,
which the Plessy Court would reiterate, that “[i]t is, of course, impossible to
enforce social equality by law.”32
Such assumptions were most rigorously theorized and starkly voiced by
proponents of “social Darwinism.” Social Darwinists argued that cultures tend to
conform to patterns of behavior that have a settled, even “natural” quality to them,
being the end product of generations of testing and experimentation. To attack the
cultural commitments on which social relations rely through ambitious legal
reform, adherents to this conservative ideology concluded, was sheer folly. English
philosopher Herbert Spencer, the originator of the term “survival of the fittest,”
went so far as to argue that state regulation risked disrupting the beneficial
pathways of natural selection.33 Social welfare programs “put a stop to that natural
process of elimination by which society continually purifies itself.”34
Even if one preferred not to embrace the brutal, amoral consequences of
Spencer’s extreme defense of laissez faire policy, the basic premise of social
Darwinist theorists, that social patterns and customs derived from a complex
selection process that should not be disturbed precipitously, became a powerful
bulwark of the status quo against all forms of social welfare legislation,
particularly in the area of race relations.35 William Graham Sumner, the most
influential advocate of social Darwinism in the United States, argued that
“folkways”—the customs, mores, and traditions that made up a culture—were the
product of evolutionary “natural forces,” and were therefore largely immune from
legal constraints that attempted to drastically reshape them.36 The best laws could
do was reinforce already established majority customs and beliefs. For generations
of southern proponents of Jim Crow, Sumner’s dictum that “stateways” were

31

Id.
People v. King, 110 N.Y. 418, 427 (1888).
33
CARL N. D EGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE: THE D ECLINE AND REVIVAL OF
DARWINISM IN A MERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT 11 (1991).
34
Id.
35
Social Darwinism was a basis for theories of scientific racism. If existing social
patterns were the product a natural selection process, then the fact of white supremacy
reflects innate superiority of the white race. In this way, social Darwinists supported the
naturalization of socially constructed racial hierarchies. Scientific racism was a key
intellectual prop for the development and perpetuation of the Jim Crow regime in the South
as well as its general acceptance among whites outside the South. See, e.g., id.; Herbert
Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624, 634–35
(1985).
36
SUMNER, supra note 9, at 55–57, 77–78, 87.
32
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powerless to change “folkways” became, according to Gunnar Myrdal, “a general
formula of mystical significance.”37
A skepticism that the guiding hand of the law could improve race relations
pervaded American society by the early twentieth century. The idealistic post–
Civil War moment in which the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments
were ratified had faded into the past. Congress’s last effort in the field of civil
rights, the ambitious public accommodations legislation in the Civil Rights Act of
1875, had been struck down by the Supreme Court in 1883.38 After Reconstruction,
northern attention turned from the South, and the federal government largely left
the white South to itself as its leaders reconstituted their society around the
principle of white supremacy. If there was any recognition of the deep irony that a
central tool for building the Jim Crow South was, in fact, Jim Crow law,39 it was
generally explained away by emphasizing that these laws were simply reflecting
already existent social commitments. Laws were following customs. Laws were
not telling the people (or at least whites) to do anything they were not already
disposed to do anyway.40
Even social scientists who did not accept the deep conservatism of the
Sumnerian folkways school often accepted its basic skepticism toward the capacity
of law. One of the leading social scientists of the early twentieth century was
Robert E. Park, who, like Sumner, had little faith that social reform could work
when it opposed established, “natural,” dynamics of behavior and custom. In a
1935 essay, Park wrote:
the political process can only proceed in a relatively orderly way in so far
as it generates political power and authority capable of enforcing a
certain degree of order and discipline until a new equilibrium has been
achieved and the changes which the new programs initiated have been
assimilated, digested and incorporated with the folkways of the original
and historic society.41
37

GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN A MERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY 1049 (1944). Segregationists who rejected the anti-religious connotations of
Social Darwinism could replicate its status-quo enforcing benefits by substituting the hand
of God for the mechanism of natural selection. As the Richmond Times declared in 1900:
“God Almighty drew the color line and it cannot be obliterated.” C. VANN WOODWARD,
THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 81 (1955).
38
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25–26 (1883).
39
“What is particularly ironic is that while Northern opinion was rejecting legislation
as an instrument of social change, Southern legislators were busy enacting one Jim Crow
law after another, all consciously designed to buttress the white-supremacy system and to
perpetuate regional attitudes of prejudice and hostility toward the Negro.” Will Maslow,
The Uses of Law in the Struggle for Equality, 22 SOC. RESEARCH 297, 297–98 (1955).
40
See generally GILBERT T. STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW
348–53 (1910) (describing segregation laws as reinforcing customary practices).
41
MYRDAL, supra note 37, at 1050 (quoting Robert E. Park, Social Planning and
Human Nature, PUBLICATIONS OF THE A M. SOC. SOC’Y, Aug. 1935, at 28).
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Such observations held with particular force when it came to race relations. The
racial status quo, he suggested, “might comprise . . . all those situations in which
some relatively stable equilibrium between competing races has been achieved and
in which the resulting social order has become fixed in custom and tradition.”42
Racial prejudice, in this model, served a necessary role in “preserv[ing] the social
order and the social distances upon which that order rests.”43 To introduce laws
interfering with these natural and necessary prejudices would be foolhardy.
The courts and the legal academy were dominated by a sense of fatalism
toward the entire concept of civil rights law—or any law that attempted to remake
existing social arrangements by regulating interpersonal relations directly. British
jurist James Bryce, a close observer of American society and governance,
embraced the Sumnerian line when he proclaimed in a 1902 lecture: “As regards
social relations, law can do but little in the way of expressing the view the State
takes of how its members should behave to one another. Good feeling and good
manners cannot by imposed by statute.”44 Indeed, a fatalism toward the force of
law was evident in practically all the great American legal figures of the day.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in the words of one biographer, “did not
believe that law could change the attitudes and practices of a culture. He believed
the reverse, that law was a product of those attitudes and practices.”45 Holmes’s
tendency toward fatalism at times echoed the sentiments of social Darwinists.46 In
Giles v. Harris,47 a 1903 case involving the denial of voting rights to African
Americans in Alabama, Holmes explained that a holding on behalf of the petitioner
would be futile—it would risk being nothing more than an “empty form.”48 The
Giles decision and a follow-up decision denying money damages to the petitioner49
42

Id. (quoting Robert E. Park, The Nature of Race Relations, in RACE RELATIONS
3–4 (Edgar T. Thompson, ed., Greenwood Press 1969) (1939)).
43
Robert E. Park, The Concept of Social Distance, in 1 RACE AND CULTURE: THE
COLLECTED PAPERS OF ROBERT EZRA PARK 260 (1950); see also Philip Gleason,
Americans All: World War II and the Shaping of American Identity, 43 REV. POL. 483,
495–98 (1981) (summarizing Park’s benign view of prejudice).
44
MYRDAL, supra note 37, at 574 (quoting JAMES BRYCE, THE RELATIONS OF THE
ADVANCED AND THE BACKWARD RACES OF MANKIND 43 (1902)).
45
G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE O LIVER W ENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER
SELF 342–43 (1993).
46
Holmes’ private writings included observations such as “I see the inevitable
everywhere,” 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES
AND HAROLD J. LASKI 1916–1935, at 230 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) [hereinafter
HOLMES-LASKI], “I do accept a ‘rough equation between isness and oughtness,’” id. at 948,
and his famous proclamation: “if my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them,” 1
HOLMES-LASKI, supra at 249. See generally Yosal Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U.
CHI. L. REV. 213, 243–56 (1964) (describing and criticizing Holmes’ detachment from
popular affairs).
47
189 U.S. 475 (1903).
48
Id. at 488.
49
Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146, 166 (1904).
AND THE RACE PROBLEM
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were “among the Court’s most candid confessions of limited power,” according to
legal historian Michael Klarman.50 These decisions “suggest that even plain
constitutional violations during peacetime may go unredressed in the face of
hostile public opinion.”51
A classic articulation of this chastened vision of the law came in an address
Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound delivered to the Pennsylvania Bar
Association in 1916, titled “The Limits of Effective Legal Action.”52 Pound
delivered a warning to those Progressive reformers who would ask too much of the
law. There were considerable risks to “over-ambitious plans to regulate every
phase of human action by law” pressed by those who argue for “continual resort to
law to supply the deficiencies of other agencies of social control” and who
“attempt[] to govern by means of law things which in their nature do not admit of
objective treatment and external coercion.”53 Pound cautioned, “In the wake of
ambitious social programs calling for more and more interference with every
relation of life, dissatisfaction with law, criticism of legal and judicial institutions,
and suspicion as to the purposes of the lawyer become universal.”54 The end result
is pervasive nonenforcement of the law—what Pound famously labeled as “the
divergence between the law in the books and the law in action”55—which “is in
reality a problem of the intrinsic limitations upon effective legal action.”56 “The
life of the law is in its enforcement,”57 Pound declared, and the law should not be
used “to register the protest of society against wrong.”58 For laws to be properly
enforced, people must be motivated to follow the law by something more than “the
abstract content of the rule and its conformity to an ideal justice of an ideal of
social interest.”59
The primary targets of Dean Pound’s criticism were Progressives who sought
to repudiate the conservative ideology of the social Darwinists. The era was
marked by legislative efforts to alleviate some of the harsh consequences of
unfettered capitalism as well as to regulate the social behavior of the lower classes,
particularly the newly arrived immigrants. Although Pound worried that these
efforts went too far, reformers were energized in their battle against Sumner’s
dismissal of efforts to remake society as dangerous pipe dreams. One of the major
goals of the Progressives was to use the law to further their efforts to help the
downtrodden. Progressive-era legal reforms often began relatively small, with
municipal-level reforms, but in the first two decades of the twentieth century
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reformers mobilized a national campaign that culminated in federal legislation and
several constitutional amendments.
But the effect of the Progressives’ commitment to legal reform on race
relations was limited. When laws were passed that were intended to affect racial
practices, they were generally in line with the prevalent racist attitudes of the day.
Jim Crow laws were part of the Progressive agenda in the South.60 There was not
sufficient public support for civil rights legislation. Even among those who might
have held some sympathy for the principle of civil rights, many assumed that race
relations were simply different from other social practices—they were more
emotional, more entrenched, and thus less amendable to legal reform. In terms of
social policy, there arose the idea of racial exceptionalism: general rules guiding
the relationship between law and society did not apply in the same way when racial
relations were at issue. Even as Progressives enthusiastically called upon the law,
in Pound’s words, “ambitiously to cover the whole field of social control,”61 social
Darwinism remained a powerful presumption in the area of racial policy.62
This is not to say that liberals of the period were universally skeptical of the
capacity of law to ameliorate the harshest elements of life for African Americans
during the ignominious heyday of Jim Crow America. The NAACP, formed in
1909, was explicitly dedicated to using the force of the law to protect the interests
of black Americans. Efforts to pass federal antilynching legislation were
periodically made in the interwar years. Yet even among those who recognized
that government could do far more to help African Americans, many emphasized
an important qualification regarding the kind of legal reform that could be effective
in this area. As leaders of the NAACP and other civil rights advocates pressed for
increased judicial intervention, other liberals argued that court decisions were
limited in what they could accomplish in this area—an argument that dovetailed
nicely with the Progressive presumption in favor of judicial deference to legislative
action that coalesced with the liberal attacks on the Lochner Court. This preference
for legislation over court order was most frequently justified on the grounds of
democratic principles—allowing the elected branches to take the lead in reform
efforts made government more accountable and responsive to the people. But it
60
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also recognized the particular efficacy of statutes as opposed to judicial rulings.
For example, even as he questioned the wisdom of issuing a decision in Giles that
would be nothing more than an “empty form,” Holmes emphasized that “relief
from a great political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the people of a state and the
state itself, must be given by them or by the legislative and political department of
the government of the United States.”63 Holmes’s protégé and future Supreme
Court Justice Felix Frankfurter questioned the social effects of judicial decrees in
an essay entitled, “Can the Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration?”64 “The real
battles of liberalism are not won in the Supreme Court,” Frankfurter contended. 65
“Only a persistent, positive translation of the liberal faith into the thoughts and acts
of the community is the real reliance against the unabated temptation to straitjacket
the human mind.”66 From this conception, law, to be effective, must derive from
and reinforce culture, “the thoughts and acts of the community.” The closer the
connection between law and society, the stronger and more effective the law is. In
this vision of law, which still contained a generous dose of Sumnerian folkways
ideology, legislative action could be effective because it necessarily reflected
popular attitudes. Federal courts on the other hand were the most detached from
immediate circumstances, and therefore had to be the most circumspect with their
intervention into social relations.
B. Prohibition and the Problem of “Legislating Morality”
In the years following World War II, as racial liberals fought to mobilize
support for legal reform, they found themselves battling against not only the
traditional obstacles for civil rights—entrenched racism, intransigent apathy, and
stubborn ignorance—but also the ghost of the failed crusade to rid the nation of
alcohol. No event of the twentieth century gave greater comfort to skeptics of the
power of the law to shape social norms than the ignominious failure of Prohibition.
Here was the perfect example of an idealistic movement for social change that
turned to the law to force the entire nation to conform to a certain ideal of the
good—and it backfired in glorious fashion. In its wake was left a generation of
liberals who were forced to reconsider the problems of enforcing positive law that
ran contrary to the deeply felt commitments of a large segment of the population.67
Prohibition, lamented James Truslow Adams, was just the latest and most
egregious example of a disturbing pattern of American history in which reformers
“believe[] that their ideals should be expressed in the form of law, regardless of the
63
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practical question of whether such laws could be enforced . . . . Because we have
ceased to have any respect for law we allow any sort of law to be passed.”68
One of the more remarkable facts of the failure of Prohibition was that the
temperance movement had secured not just the majorities necessary to pass local
and eventually national regulations, but the supermajorities across the nation
necessary to amend the Constitution.69 Yet this support proved transitory.
Prohibition, almost from the day it became the law of the land, began losing
support. Not only did it face the self-evident obstacle to trying to force a populace
to stop doing something that many, many people were not about to give up,
Prohibition also posed a dilemma for Progressives who sought to portray the
regulatory state as a beneficial and benign part of modern society. But the
increasingly unpopularity of Prohibition was giving social regulation a bad name
—it risked turning the nascent administrative state into a police state.70 Prohibition
also forced upon Progressives the stubborn persistence of custom on defining the
limits of the enforceable law.71
The “noble experiment” in legalized morality led to a whole new array of
problems. “The question is frequently asked,” wrote James Truslow Adams in
1928, “Is the Eighteenth Amendment making us a nation of lawbreakers?”72 Few
would take issue with Adams’s conclusion that “the Amendment is helping to
break down respect for law itself.”73 As outlined in the report of the National
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (commonly known as the
Wickersham Commission), Prohibition encouraged political corruption, created a
thriving bootlegging economy, strained the criminal justice system, and often
failed to receive necessary state enforcement. Not only did the report find
increased consumption of alcohol after 1920, but it warned that the current
situation encouraged a general disrespect for the law.74 President Warren Harding
declared the inability to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment “the most
demoralizing factor in our public life.”75
Prohibition’s failure left its mark on future projects of social reform. Historian
David E. Kyvig explains that Prohibition “helped discredit the view that society
could be reformed and uplifted simply through passage of the proper statutes.”76
Making new laws was quite different than actually enforcing new laws, ex68
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president of Yale Arthur Twining Hadley explained in 1925. “Conscience and
public opinion enforce the laws; the police suppress the exceptions.”77 Therefore,
“government authorities must be careful not to go beyond what public opinion
demands in the laws which it makes or the acts which it requires.”78 Supreme
Court Justice Harlan F. Stone warned of the
child-like and implicit faith in the efficacy of legislation to bring about
social Utopia. . . . Forgetting that social custom and the average moral
standards of the community are more potent in the control of human
conduct than formal law, we nevertheless seem to regard statute making
as the chief and only ultimate agency of social reform and the never
failing means for the minute regulation and control of all human
activities.79
Just as Prohibition was doomed to failure in the cities and within certain immigrant
communities, so might civil rights legislation be doomed to failure in the South.
The experience of Prohibition reinforced the measured skepticism toward salvation
through legal reform that characterized the writings of legal scholars and social
scientists. Its echoes would be heard in the emerging civil rights debate of the
coming decades.
C. Intergroup Education and Antiprejudice Campaigns
One reason for the longevity of the “folkways” assumptions about the relation
between law and race relations was the way they were adapted to fit various
agendas and political ideologies. These assumptions were, of course, a central
element in the laissez faire ideology of conservative social Darwinists who saw all
legal efforts to promote social welfare as dangerous meddling in the natural course
of social development (which inevitably included social divisions). “[I]n the
folkways,” Sumner wrote, “whatever is, is right.”80 But the folkways premise did
not necessarily lead to conservative, pessimistic conclusions. By the early decades
of the twentieth century, a far more moderate version of the folkways school of
thought emerged, promoted by groups that hoped to improve relations between
racial, ethnic, and religious groups. Skeptical of legal reform as a path toward
intergroup harmony, proponents of folkways liberalism believed progress would
come from directly addressing destructive customs and beliefs through education.
By the 1920s and 1930s, campaigns to promote intergroup understanding and
77
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lessen prejudice would become the centerpiece of the liberal campaign to improve
American race relations.
Racial reformers in the interwar period, working within an ideological
environment in which it was widely accepted that bold civil rights measures would
be counterproductive, created one of the most important movements for racial
progress of the day. The “intergroup” or “tolerance” movement was a loose
coalition of like-minded reform efforts found in both the North and the South from
the 1920s into the 1940s when it was at the forefront of interracial progressive
reform.81 The movement achieved its greatest institutional success in organizations
such as the Commission on Interracial Cooperation, formed in 1919 and
reorganized in 1944 as the Southern Regional Council, and the Southern
Conference for Human Welfare, formed in 1938.82 By the early postwar period, the
intergroup movement had expanded to include hundreds of national agencies and
thousands of local ones.83 The goal of these efforts was to reduce prejudice through
educating individuals to appreciate difference and also to learn that many
suspected differences between groups had no basis in reality.84 By better
understanding others, whether through direct contact with other groups or through
education, tolerationists hoped that stereotypes would be undermined, and a new
generation of tolerant American citizens created. While the predominant focus of
this movement during its formative years in the 1920s was on reducing tensions
based on ethnicity and religion (where they had their greatest successes), by the
1940s it was increasingly addressing racial antagonism.85
Among African American lawyers, the interwar years saw a commitment to
volunteerism and intraracial self-help, which was often accompanied by a
skeptical—or at least wary—attitude toward legal reform.86 “The voluntarist
impulse,” writes legal historian Kenneth Mack, was a reaction to the legalization of
the social mores of the majority of the population that did not support
equal citizenship for blacks. If public opinion was opposed to granting
legal equality to blacks, and if law followed public opinion, then one
solution was the voluntarist one—simply to be let alone to concentrate
on intraracial development.87
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Some leading black lawyers accepted a basic tenet of Sumner’s folkways
analysis—that, “the causal arrow ran from social change to legal change rather
than the other way around.”88 Yet the fight to change the law was sometimes still
important. Civil rights lawyers recognized litigation and lobbying efforts as
offering benefits above and beyond any courtroom victories that might result, as
they could help mobilize and educate the black community.89
Intergroup educational efforts accelerated during the war years. “[B]y making
the need for national unity more compelling,” one historian noted, World War II
“intensified efforts that were already under way to cut down prejudice, improve
intergroup relations, and promote greater toleration of diversity.”90 “The solution
of our race problem,” noted historian John Hope Franklin in 1944, “is education:
education of the whites that they may understand that the denial of rights to
minorities is just as dangerous to democracy in the United States as it is in
Europe.”91
Southern liberals were particularly committed to the idea that racial progress
would come through education rather than legal reform. They held onto this
commitment after northern racial liberals had largely accepted legal reform as a
necessary and proper tool for breaking the back of Jim Crow.92 The educationalist
approach suited the more moderate temperament of southern liberals. It allowed
for a gradual transition away from Jim Crow, taking into account the high psychic
costs such a transition would have for white southerners and avoiding any sudden
breaks that might lead to violent backlash. It also addressed a key concern for
southern liberals, the preservation of states’ rights. Intergroup cooperation groups
could be effective without challenging state autonomy—without resorting to
“outside interference”—something that all southerners hoped to avoid. This
approach bypassed the difficult choice between supporting racial progress and
standing up against federal encroachment on state power. Of course, the
educationalist approach also held a pragmatic element for southern liberals. They
recognized that southern states and localities were unlikely to pass legal reform,
and that their greatest opportunity came through community educational
programs—which, they believed, would eventually lead to local and state civil
rights reform.
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Into the post–World War II period, even as the legalist approach gained
prominence in national discussions of racial reform, antilegalist sentiment
remained strong among those who professed themselves interested in promoting
the cause of racial equality, in the South and elsewhere. When the New York state
legislature was debating landmark employment discrimination legislation in 1945,
Oswald Garrison Villard, a leading liberal voice in discussions of race relations,
attacked the new law, declaring it “far wiser to rely on the force of slow but
steadily growing public opinion” rather than legislation.93 A poll taken in 1948
found that four out of every ten people surveyed believed that “people can’t be
forced to change deep-rooted prejudices by passing laws.”94 As late as 1955, in the
period immediately following Brown, Will Maslow, the director of the American
Jewish Congress’s Commission on Law and Social Action, summarized the
skepticism toward the capacity of the law found in Plessy and the writing of
Sumner and warned: “The doctrine persists.”95
So when the postwar generation of racial liberals launched their campaign to
elevate the place of the law in the debate over how to deal with America’s racial
problem, they were taking on not only segregationists who saw “racial instincts”
and prejudices as natural and inevitable, but also a powerful strand of liberalism
that saw the race problem as necessitating, first and foremost, education, exposure,
perhaps even some forms of indoctrination—but not a full-blown civil rights
reform effort.
III. THE CASE FOR THE LAW
In the world laboratory of the sociologist, as in the more secluded
laboratories of the physicist and chemist, it is the successful experiment
which is decisive and not the thousand-and-one failures which preceded
it. More is learned from the single success than from the multiple
failures. A single success proves it can be done.96
The antilegalist sentiment toward race relations of the Plessy Court and the
social Darwinists remained strong well into the twentieth century, in both its
conservative and reformist manifestations. Skepticism toward the efficacy of civil
93
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rights reform was a central line of defense for defenders of Jim Crow through the
civil rights movement. This same skepticism steered racial progressives in the
1920s and 1930s toward educationalist projects, rather than legal reform, and it
remained a central tenet of southern liberalism into the 1960s. These assumptions
would have to be overcome if the nation were to be steered on a new course of a
national commitment to civil rights, even in the face of considerable resistance in
the white South.
The creation of a compelling, persuasive ideology of civil rights reform had
two elements, each aimed at assumptions of the folkways school of thought. First
was to destabilize the belief that racial hierarchies were natural and inflexible and
that racial prejudice was a natural component of the human condition.97 Second
was to press the argument that legal commands can be particularly effective in
transforming social relations.98 These two projects were necessarily connected. The
more malleable the attitudes and customs of Jim Crow, the more readily outside
pressures, such as a federal law, could reform these attitudes and customs. And the
more powerful the law, the deeper into Jim Crow race relations it could penetrate.
Thus, the case for the capacity of the law made these two interlocking arguments:
iniquitous racial customs and prejudices were not nearly as entrenched as was
generally assumed (and certainly not the solid rock of Sumnerian folkways); and
wide-scale legal reform was the most effective way to lead the nation away from
its damaging tradition of racial inequality.
A. Myrdal’s Critique of the Folkways Principle
Gunnar Myrdal’s monumental 1944 study of race relations in the United
States, An American Dilemma,99 has often been heralded as marking a major
breakthrough in the creation of intellectual foundations of the modern civil rights
movement. At the time of its publication, it was widely recognized as a definitive
statement on the pervasive costs of racial discrimination, including segregation, on
American society. Hardly a statement on race relations was issued in the decade
following its publication without an appreciative reference to the thousand-plus
page study by the Swedish sociologist and his team of researchers.100 Most
famously, Chief Justice Earl Warren referenced the work in the controversial
footnote eleven of the Brown decision.101 Yet for all the thoroughness of analysis
and research that went into An American Dilemma, it failed to recognize the central
role that law—particularly federal legislative, executive, and judicial action—
would play in the struggle for civil rights.
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In the two-prong attack on folkways assumptions that racial liberals fought in
the postwar years, Myrdal made invaluable contributions to the first, arguing that
the nation was ready and willing to abandon its racist commitments, and that there
was a deep (if recessive) national commitment to egalitarianism, which he labeled
the “American Creed.”102 At times, Myrdal seemed to believe that the key support
for Jim Crow was simple ignorance—southerners did not recognize the American
tradition of equality and assumed that racial hierarchies were necessary to safety
and prosperity; northerners had little appreciation of the systematic refutation of
the American ideal of equality taking place in the Jim Crow South.103 So the path
forward, according to An American Dilemma, lay in knowledge: in better schools;
in better media coverage, leading to more publicity of what was happening in the
South; and, above all, in the application of scientific expertise to the race problem.
“In a sense, the social engineering of the coming epoch will be nothing but the
drawing of practical conclusions from the teaching of social science that ‘human
nature’ is changeable and that human deficiencies and unhappiness are, in large
degree, preventable.”104
Myrdal gave little attention, however, to the critical second prong of racial
legalism—the primacy of law in the assault on Jim Crow. Unlike the generation of
civil rights supporters who came to power and influence in the years following An
American Dilemma, Myrdal was tentative in relying on law as the catalyst for
instigating this great American reawakening. He did not ignore the potential of
civil rights reform. He lashed out, for example, at the “intellectual defeatism” of
American sociologists, who, still under the influence of Sumner, were overly
skeptical “towards the possibility of inducing social change by means of
legislation.”105 Yet he qualified these conclusions with references to a “general
distrust of politics and legislation that is widespread among the educated classes of
Americans.”106 He emphasized an American tradition of disrespect for the rule of
law, particularly in the South,107 and he warned of a distinctly American “desire to
regulate human behavior tyrannically by means of formal laws” citing failed
efforts to legislate against drinking as an example.108 If laws were to work, they
would have to be carefully considered; they would need to be framed and
monitored by trained experts; and they would need to be part of a multiprong
102
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project of social engineering. “We are entering an era where fact-finding and
scientific theories of causal relations will be seen as instrumental in planning
controlled social change”—these are “new urgent tasks for social engineering.”109
While Myrdal certainly saw a role for legal reform (law was “a weapon in the caste
struggle”110) he placed his greatest hope for change in a national “educational
offensive against racial intolerance.”111 Myrdal was more an educationalist than a
legalist. In the end, he put far more faith in education and intergroup consultation
than in legal compulsion.
As valuable as Myrdal’s diagnostic analysis of American race relations was,
the failure of An American Dilemma to engage at any length with law’s capacity to
change racial dynamics limited its utility to the postwar generation of civil rights
reformers. Robert MacIver, a Columbia University sociologist, highlighted these
limitations when he criticized Myrdal for failing to offer a tangible plan for reform.
Myrdal’s basic premise, MacIver explained, was “that a more precise knowledge
of the facts will of itself provide the answer to our question.”112 Simply learning
more about the problem, Myrdal seemed to assume, would somehow solve it. But,
for postwar civil rights advocates, this faith in exposure to facts and the slow
processes of education was not enough. Works such as An American Dilemma,
MacIver noted, “convey no message to the framers of social policy . . . .”113
Similarly, sociologist Robert Merton warned, “One does not expect a paranoiac to
abandon his hard-won distortions and delusions upon being informed that they are
altogether groundless . . . . Nor will a continuing ‘educational campaign’ itself
destroy racial prejudice and discrimination.”114 What was needed, Merton
explained, were “deliberate institutional controls.”115 Prejudices “can be helped
over the threshold of oblivion, not by insisting that it is unreasonable and unworthy
of them to survive, but by cutting off their sustenance now provided by certain
institutions of our society.”116 And the way to reform institutions was to change the
law.
B. The Turn to the Law
Even as An American Dilemma dissected the problem, liberal scholars and
activists were constructing a new working consensus on the law-versus-education
question. The educationalist position—that progress would come through
reeducation to lessen prejudicial attitudes—was surpassed in the postwar era by the
109
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growing commitment to legal reform. This development was made possible by the
efforts of racial liberals who adroitly promoted their newfound respect for the
power of laws to remake race relations.
With the war’s end, as the American people turned toward the challenges of
demobilization and reconversion to a peace-time society, as they tried to come to
terms with the lessons of their battle with fascism, and with the Holocaust, and as
they looked at the new national security challenges of the Cold War, the
intellectual battle lines in the struggle against Jim Crow shifted. Faith in laws and
the institutions of government, especially the federal government, as the necessary
locus for efforts of social reform has roots in many events in American history,
from the Civil War to the campaigns of the Populists and Progressives, but for
postwar civil rights proponents, the New Deal experience was central. Many
leaders in the racial liberal movement worked in government during the New Deal
and war years, including not only lawyers but also social scientists, and their
experience in using the law to regulate economic relations led them to
optimistically assess the possibility of doing the same for race relations.117 Myrdal
wrote that the New Deal legitimized a commitment “to use the state as an
instrument for induced social change,”118 a theme that President Truman
emphasized when he sought to include federal civil rights protections as a
component of his “Fair Deal” program. “The extension of civil rights today,”
Truman told the 1947 convention of the NAACP, “means, not protection of the
people against the Government, but protection of the people by the Government. . .
. Our National Government must show the way.”119
This legalistic turn also had roots in the experience of the Second World War.
The lessons many liberals learned from Nazi Germany was that the best defense
America had in avoiding a similar fate was a faith in the American legal system.120
The conflation of fascism and Soviet Communism under the rubric of
“totalitarianism” extended this heightened linkage of democracy with the rule of
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law into the early Cold War period.121 Americans thankfully praised the sturdy,
stabilizing nature of their political system, marking a sharp change in the
discussion from Myrdal’s descriptions of the nation’s “anarchistic” and lawless
tendencies. Legal historian Kermit Hall nicely captured this development when he
wrote of “an awakening realization of the instrumental relationship between legal
and social change” in this period.122
This willingness to look to the law as the basis for national strength in a world
filled with totalitarian threats was further reinforced by the fact that requirements
of American foreign policy during the Cold War spurred civil rights reform at
home. Simply put, the United States was embarrassed by Soviet propaganda,
which exploited racial discrimination in the nation that portrayed itself as the
center of the “free world.” To avoid alienating potential allies, particularly in the
Third World, U.S. policymakers often expressed a willingness to support civil
rights. But, to serve the needs of American foreign policy, this reform needed to be
national in scope (preferably linked in some way to the federal government) and
highly publicized. This was a battle of image as much as (or, perhaps, more than)
real change.123 Community antiprejudice efforts and intergroup understanding
campaigns did not fit this bill; federal civil rights reform—legislation, executive
orders, and Supreme Court decisions—did. With pressures both internal and
external, it is not surprising that this generation would reevaluate previous
assumptions about the potential for the law to positively impact the social
challenges of the day.
All of these factors created a postwar generation of liberal social scientists
who at times displayed an almost utopian faith in the power of the law to structure
behavior. “[T]o control man’s social environment is to control man. This is the
main task of the law,” pronounced the authors of a 1947 law review article.124 The
major sins of racial oppression were, with increasing frequency, attributed less to
underlying attitudes and more to legalities. If, as one scholar concluded, “[t]he
chief device of racial segregation in the South is law,” 125 then the proper remedy
was self evident. At times, this faith in the law bordered on the naïve; at times, it
suggested a pragmatic appraisal of the instrumental potential of law-centered
rhetoric.

121

Les K. Adler & Thomas G. Paterson, Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany
and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930’s–1950’s, 75 AM. HIST.
REV. 1046 (1970).
122
KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN A MERICAN HISTORY 266 (1989).
123
See DUDZIAK, supra note 7.
124
Sidney Post Simpson & Ruth Field, Social Engineering Through Law: The Need
for a School of Applied Jurisprudence, 22 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 145, 145 (1947).
125
Ira De A. Reid, Southern Ways, SURVEY GRAPHIC, Jan. 1947, at 39.

1514

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

C. The Case for Law’s Capacity
The rise of the legalist perspective came from a relatively straightforward
insight: attitudes can follow actions. By this insight, postwar racial liberals sought
to completely overturn the assumptions of folkways ideology. Social Darwinists
argued that people have a relatively stable set of beliefs and customs from which
their behavior derived; therefore, these folkways could not be (and should not be)
reformed by legal command.126 By contrast, postwar social scientists, following
Myrdal, saw much less stability in popular customs and beliefs; they were largely a
product of habits and actions and behavior, all of which could be changed by
changing legal requirements. Once people start acting differently—when they are
required to follow employment antidiscrimination regulations, for instance—their
attitudes toward racial minorities will change as well. Law itself was a major
creator of attitudes; law had a crucial role in the education of society.
Alternately, some argued that beneficial social change could arrive without
necessarily draining citizens of internalized racist sentiments. Robert MacIver
argued that the central target for government action should be discrimination (i.e.,
actions), rather than prejudice (i.e., beliefs): “Wherever the direct attack is feasible,
that is, the attack on discrimination itself, it is more promising than the indirect
attack, that is the attack on prejudice as such. It is more effective to challenge
conditions than to challenge attitudes or feelings.”127 MacIver here was making an
analytical move central to the racial liberals. Whereas the premise of folkways
thought was that prejudicial beliefs were the fundamental issue and that any
“direct” approach to the problem of racial inequality would need to change these
attitudes, presumably through reeducation efforts, legalists reversed the dynamic.
Now it was the discriminatory action that was the fundamental problem, and the
beliefs were secondary to this action. Thus, a direct attack on racial inequality
meant passing laws that would require people to act differently—to stop
discriminating rather than necessarily to stop hating.
But for the more optimistic of racial liberals, MacIver’s theory of racial
progress did not go far enough; he was too skeptical of the ability for changed
circumstances and actions to affect attitudes. And once people stop discriminating,
once the legally imposed barriers that separated people were broken down, then the
secondary benefits could be realized, namely the weakening of prejudice. So, in
the end, the attack on discriminatory actions, these racial liberals argued, would in
fact result in more egalitarian sentiments.128 And, following Myrdal’s premise,
126
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these sentiments were lying just below the surface, waiting to be let loose. Or, in
the words of B.R. Brazeal, former dean of Morehouse College, “Progressive
democracy thrives on laws and juridical precedents which urge us, despite our
mores, toward a greater recognition of human and social values.”129 As Will
Maslow, perhaps the most persistent and influential advocate of the legalist
position, explained, “in certain situations the absolute fiat of government is now
deemed more effective than education in bringing about social change.”130
One of the key points pressed by racial liberals was to complicate the
traditional concept of “law.” The law-versus-education “dichotomy is a forced and
unnatural one,” Maslow and Joseph B. Robison argued.131 “[L]aw itself is a form
of education and education is the prerequisite to an effective use of law.”132
Skepticism toward civil rights law “arises out of an outmoded notion that law is
simply an extension of the policeman’s club and that punishment alone is too crude
an instrument to deal with deeply rooted prejudices and patterns of behavior.”133
But a recent generation of “social scientists have broadened our understanding of

129
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the causes of discrimination and of prejudice,” necessitating that “our conception
of the role of law in a multigroup society . . . be revised drastically.”134
In new findings in psychology, advocates of legally enforced integration were
able to locate a scientific basis for their position. Racial liberals added specificity
to the idea that law affected personal beliefs, particularly in the realm of
segregation, when they began drawing on the sociological concept of “contact
theory.” This theory, premised on the idea that increased interaction among diverse
groups would lead to improved relations between these groups, had largely
displaced notions prominent earlier in the century that assumed unnecessary
interactions between different groups risked destabilizing society. The basis of
contact theory was that ignorance produced prejudice, and the best remedy for
ignorance was exposure and education. And here is where the law could play a
role, since, as one scholar put it, “some kind of legal force is necessary to bring
members of the two groups into a close enough relationship for the discriminators
to learn from experience how inadequate their stereotypes have really been.”135
Social psychologists quickly built an entire scholarly literature around contact
theory. Numerous experiments in interracial living came to the conclusion that,
under the proper circumstances, living in close contact made different groups more
tolerant and less prejudiced;136 military137 and workplace138 integration studies
offered much the same conclusion.139
134

Id. See also Polier, supra note 130, at 490 (“[T]he significance of law is not alone
in the control of those who do not hold certain convictions but also in the control of the
actual behavior of the conviction-holder . . . . The power of the law is . . . in the
crystallization of the moral values which exist within the majority itself, indeed within
every individual.”).
135
Gene Weltfish, Some Problems on Which We Need More Facts–and Some
Implications for Action, 1 J. SOC. ISSUES 47, 52 (1945).
136
See, e.g., TOM C. CLARK & PHILIP B. PERLMAN, PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY: AN
HISTORIC BRIEF AGAINST RACIAL COVENANTS 84–85 (1948) (reprint of Justice Department
amicus brief in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)); MORTON DEUTSCH & MARY
EVANS COLLINS, INTERRACIAL HOUSING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF A SOCIAL
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Psychology supported the cause of racial liberals with a legalist agenda in
another way. To believe that laws could serve an educative role, the very concept
of antiprejudice “education” had to be rethought. Rather than the gradual reshaping
of Sumnerian folkways favored by the earlier educationist approach, some racial
liberals advocated a model of reeducation based on the more drastic attitudinal
reshaping, which modern psychology convinced them was possible.140 Since racial
liberals, following the lead of the psychologists, saw prejudice as basically
irrational,141 careful demonstration of the flaws in the bigots’ reasoning would be
ineffective. Rather, what was needed was a kind of attitudinal shock treatment. As
the authors of The Authoritarian Personality explained, to deal with prejudiced
people, one must exploit their tendency toward submissiveness to authority. The
authoritarian personality type (a category that included southern racists) “would be
impressed by legal restraints against discrimination, and . . . his self-restraint
would increase as minority groups became stronger through being protected.”142
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With their appreciation for the power of the law, racial liberals reevaluated the
relationship between segregation policy and race relations. Rather than viewing
laws as simply reflections of societal attitudes, they could now be seen as
formative influences on these attitudes. It was clear to racial liberals that
discrimination, particularly when sanctioned by the state in the form of statutes,
court decisions, and executive orders, increased prejudice.143 “[I]t is law—
prejudiced, written law—that sets the discriminatory pattern,” wrote the editors of
the New York Times in explaining their support for civil rights legislation.144 And if
this was true, so was the converse. Dismissing the “rigid fatalism of William
Graham Sumner,” Maslow argued that “removing discrimination results as a byproduct in a lessening of prejudice.”145 The report of the President’s Committee on
Civil Rights—the most influential civil rights policy statement of the early postwar
years—came to much the same conclusion: “The achievement of full civil rights in
law may do as much to end prejudice as the end of prejudice may do to achieve
full civil rights.”146
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D. Faith Confirmed—Early Civil Rights Reforms
With seductive simplicity, the 1947 report of the President’s Commission on
Higher Education summarized the basic premise of postwar racial liberalism:
“Where assurance of good conduct in other fields of public concern has not been
forthcoming from citizen groups, the passage of laws to enforce good conduct has
been the corrective method of a democratic society.”147 But translating this
seemingly common-sense assumption into policy reform, moving from changing
mainstream discourse about law to changing actual law, proved a monumental
challenge.
Civil rights activists faced one of their stiffest challenges in the ultimately
unsuccessful struggle to pass federal legislation creating a permanent Fair
Employment Practices Committee (FEPC). The issue was a focal point for legalist
claims. In a 1948 editorial supporting the passage of an FEPC bill, the Washington
Post noted that while educational efforts were important, they should not be used
as a replacement for legal reform: “The example of the Federal Government is a
potent factor in the educative process.”148 Charles S. Johnson, president of Fisk
University, himself a committed proponent of educationalist reform measures,
demonstrated the growing attraction of the legalist position. “At first sight,
legislative and governmental action may not appear to fall in the category of
building bridges of understanding,” Johnson explained in 1946.149 “But such action
is educational in the deepest sense, for it teaches by example rather than precept,
and it invests that example with the authority of the national will.”150
Racial liberals also focused on executive action as another area in which to
examine the efficacy of civil rights law. By far, the most significant presidential
initiative of the period was Truman’s executive order desegregating the military. It
caused no major upheavals and was generally considered an important success
story.151 Many saw the desegregation of the military as reinforcing the “contact
theory” premise being developed by social psychologists. “[W]here men do live
and work together regardless of race and religion,” one commentator wrote,
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“prejudice and intolerance begin to decline and awareness of the importance of the
individual as against his membership in a racial group begins to grow.”152
The case for law’s capacity received its most thorough evaluation in the area
of state and local civil rights legislation. Southern members of Congress blocked
federal civil rights legislation through this period, but in the states and major cities
outside the Deep South, the decade following World War II saw an explosion of
antidiscrimination laws.153 In making the case for these laws, civil rights advocates
regularly drew on their confident claims about the power of civil rights laws to
change social behavior. More importantly in terms of creating pressure for
additional federal action, state and local antidiscrimination efforts provided civil
rights advocates and their allies in the social sciences plentiful evidence to draw
upon in further advancing their case for the efficacy of civil rights laws. As the
report of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights explained, a key to civil rights
progress “is to give the public living examples of civil rights in operation.”154
Civil rights activity below the federal level has largely been lost to history. In
light of the subsequent achievements of the civil rights movement, the passage of
moderate fair employment and public accommodation legislation in northern and
western states seems unremarkable, even unimportant. They were compromise
bills, lacking truly effective enforcement mechanisms, often reliant on voluntary
contributions of affected industries. But, when viewed from the perspective of the
period in which they were passed, in light of decades of inaction in protecting
blacks from racial discrimination, they marked the dawn of a new era in civil
rights: liberal activists celebrated these efforts, studying them and publicizing them
as models for more ambitious reform policy. In this way, state and local reforms
proved critical to the development of federal civil rights reform.
Although these local and state laws had many obvious shortcomings—most
significantly inadequate enforcement mechanisms—liberal reformers of the day
considered them largely effective and went out of their way to publicize them as
models of civil rights reform in action. “The act has worked, and worked
smoothly,” MacIver concluded about a landmark New York antidiscrimination
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law. “All contrary anticipations have been falsified.”155 Caroline Simon, previously
a member of the New York State Commission Against Discrimination, wrote in
1949 that the Commission had “changed the entire pattern of employment of the
most populous state in the union in less than four years.”156 In the blunt assessment
of one journalist, “[t]wo years of state FEPC’s have done more to end job
discrimination than fifty years of private agitation, good-will conferences, [and]
educational campaigning.”157
Reformers often used laudatory assessments of state-level initiatives as
empirical evidence to support similar reform in other states or, more significantly,
in the federal government. They provided tangible evidence that civil rights laws
could be effective, even in the face of considerable opposition from public opinion
and business interests. The state-level reforms were thus important stepping stones
toward a more comprehensive, far-reaching national racial reform movement. As
the fight for a permanent federal FEPC was taking place in Congress, Herbert N.
Northrup, a consultant to the wartime FEPC, drew on the experiences of state
reform as evidence for his support of the bill.158 “Thus far opponents and sponsors
of FEPC have fought their battle largely in the realm of speculation,” and the
federal FEPC could be seen as just a temporary, wartime experiment, he noted.159
“Now, however, the situation is different. We have had experience.”160 The New
York experience in particular, Northrup concluded, “has served as a laboratory for
the whole nation.”161 Northrup was not alone in his use of state and local
experiments to promote more ambitious efforts. When, in 1949, Attorney General
J. Howard McGrath sought evidence for his assertion that national civil rights laws
could contribute to the decline of prejudice, he cited the experiences of state fair
employment practices legislation as “indicating that this kind of law can create a
climate of opinion in which discrimination tends to disappear.”162 Similarly, in
framing an editorial in support of a federal civil rights bill, the New York Times
began by summarizing accomplishments that had taken place in the states.163

155

MACIVER, supra note 112, at 165.
Simon, supra note 138, at 36.
157
Irwin Ross, Tolerance by Law? 195 HARPERS 458, 465 (1947). See also Carr,
supra note 143, at 42; Charles W. Cobb, Jr., The Outlook Regarding State FEPC
Legislation, 31 J. NEGRO HIST. 247, 249 (1946); Dublirer, supra note 146, at 107; G. James
Fleming, Educational Aspects of FEPC Laws, 19 J. NEGRO EDUC. 7, 8–9 (1950); Louis C.
Kesselman, The Fair Employment Practices Commission Movement in Perspective, 31 J.
NEGRO HIST. 30, 31 (1946); Ross, supra note 137, at 24, 26.
158
Herbert R. Northrup, Proving Ground for Fair Employment: Some Lessons from
New York State’s Experience, 4 COMMENTARY 552 (1947).
159
Id. at 552.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 556.
162
Tolerance Linked to Security of U.S.: McGrath Says Civil Rights Laws Clear the
Atmosphere for Democratic Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1949, at 3.
163
Civil Rights in the States, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1949, at E8.
156

1522

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

The states were working as the social “laboratories” Justice Louis Brandeis
envisioned in an earlier era.164 They offered, in the words of Caroline Simon, a
“rough-and-ready laboratory of practical affairs.”165 As racial liberals searched for
tangible examples to support their assertion that laws could change behavior, that
racial discrimination was a social problem properly dealt with through government
action, the reforms taking place throughout much of the nation on the state and
local level proved to be invaluable resources.
E. Historians and the Origins of Jim Crow
One of the most prominent efforts to emphasize the importance of the law in
the area of race relations took place on the battlefield of historical interpretation.
When, for example, Oscar and Mary Handlin examined the origins of racism and
slavery in America, they found that the formalization of the institution of slavery
toward the end of the seventeenth century—manifested through statutes and
enforcement of contracts—solidified a racial hierarchy that exhibited considerable
fluidity in previous decades.166 The Handlins’ article directly challenged previous
accounts of the formation of slavery in early America, which had described slavery
as a consequence of innate prejudice of whites toward blacks. One scholar
described the broader implications of their claims: “Late and gradual enslavement
undercut the possibility of natural, deep-seated antipathy toward Negroes.”167
Thus, in this interpretation, it was the legalization of slavery that led to racial
discrimination, rather than, as previous scholars generally argued, preexisting
racial prejudice and discrimination that led to the development of the institution of
slavery. The relevance for the postwar civil rights campaign was obvious: “[I]f
whites and Negroes could share the same status of half freedom for forty years in
the seventeenth century, why could they not share full freedom in the twentieth?”
asked historian Winthrop Jordan.168 “Prejudice must have followed enslavement,
not vice versa, else any liberal program of action would be badly compromised.”169
While the Handlins’ reading of the history of slavery informed mid-twentieth
century racial concerns only indirectly, the influence of C. Vann Woodward’s The
Strange Career of Jim Crow (1955) was direct and immediate. Woodward
explicitly framed this book—which Martin Luther King Jr. praised as “the
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historical bible of the civil rights movement”170—not only as a reinterpretation of
the rise of segregation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, but also as
a statement about the potential for civil rights reform in postwar America. Strange
Career grew out of a series of lectures Woodward wrote in the months following
Brown and presented at the University of Virginia in the fall of 1954 (delivered, as
Woodward made a point of noting in the preface of the book, to an “unsegregated”
audience).171 Analogous to the Handlins’ findings, Woodward found a large
measure of fluidity in the racial hierarchy in the late nineteenth century, prior to
the imposition of Jim Crow statutes. The title of his second chapter, “Forgotten
Alternatives,” captured the essence of his thesis.172 Woodward’s message to the
nation, and particularly to his native South, was that race relations had not always
been this way, that segregation was a relatively recent construct, and that
dismantling Jim Crow was therefore more possible than many thought.173 As
Woodward described in the preface, “Unable to remember a time when segregation
was not the general rule and practice, [southerners] have naturally assumed that
things have ‘always been that way.’”174 The historian who more than any other
gave shape to this view that the situation had “always been that way” was Ulrich
B. Phillips, who in 1928 famously declared that the central theme of southern
history was a shared belief among whites in their supremacy over blacks.175
Woodward directly challenged this point by highlighting an era, not so far gone,
when white supremacy was not quite so dominant.
Like the Handlins, the key pieces of evidence for his argument were statutes.
Woodward explicitly critiqued Sumner’s argument that laws had little effect on
cultural practices. While conceding that “laws are not an adequate index of the
extent and prevalence of segregation and discriminatory practices in the South,”176
he emphasized that laws were essential to the development of segregation. Before
the imposition of Jim Crow laws in the late nineteenth century, Woodward wrote,
“the Negro could and did do many things in the South that in the latter part of the
period, under different conditions, he was prevented from doing.”177
“[S]egregation statutes, or ‘Jim Crow’ laws . . . constituted the most elaborate and
formal expression of sovereign white opinion upon the subject”;178 they gave an
“illusion of permanency.”179 While recognizing “evidence that segregation and
discrimination became generally practiced before they became law,” Woodward
emphasized “that segregation and ostracism were not nearly so harsh and rigid in
170
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the early years as they became later”—that is, after the legalization of Jim Crow.180
Prior to this point, “it was not yet an accepted corollary that the subordinates had to
be totally segregated and needlessly humiliated by a thousand daily reminders of
their subordination.”181 In sum: “The policies of proscription, segregation, and
disfranchisement that are often described as the immutable ‘folkways’ of the
South, impervious alike to legislative reform and armed intervention, are of a more
recent origin . . . . [T]he belief that they are immutable and unchangeable is not
supported by history.”182
Woodward, a southerner who was an outspoken critic of segregation, did not
hide the present-day concerns that he sought to address.
The national discussion over the questions of how deeply rooted, how
ineradicable, and how amenable to change the segregation practices
really are is being conducted against a background of faulty or
inadequate historical information. And some of the most widely held
sociological theories regarding segregation are based upon erroneous
history.183
That this careful and respected historian would concern himself so directly in the
ongoing debate over legal change and segregation was in large part a product of his
recent involvement with the NAACP’s legal campaign against school segregation.
Woodward, like his friend and fellow historian John Hope Franklin, had aided
Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP lawyers in their historical research.184
Looking back on his work, after over a decade of controversy over his thesis
regarding the late onset of rigidity in Jim Crow race relations, Woodward would
recognize the pressures his civil rights sympathies placed upon his scholarship.
If the thesis were sound, then the traditional defenses of segregation were
breached and weakened because they pictured the system as entrenched
in immemorial and unbroken usage and quite beyond the reach of legal
action. And again, if the system were of relatively recent origin and was
itself the result of political and legal action, then reformers might take
hope that segregation was not all that invulnerable and that the law might
be used effectively to bring about change.185
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The general belief that law was the key to understanding the development of
Jim Crow was prevalent during the early postwar period—Woodward’s work was
simply the most widely identified with this argument. For example, in 1950, law
professor Thomas Emerson, in arguing for Supreme Court leadership in ridding the
nation of racial segregation, argued that if the Court had struck down the
segregation law in Plessy, it could “have exercised its judicial powers and prestige
to nip segregation in the bud, at a time when the break with slavery was fresh.
Unfortunately, it did not choose to do so.”186 Political scientist Alan Westin wrote
a profile of Justice John Marshal Harlan, whose famous dissent in Plessy took on a
prophetic quality in the postwar period, in which he attributed Harlan’s great
midlife transformation on the race question (he had been a slaveholder before the
Civil War) to the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments—simply put, the
force of the legal transformation led to a personal transformation.187 For Westin,
writing in 1957, three years after Brown, the implications for the present were
clear: “Now, like Harlan, these men [i.e., white southerners] have been carried
across the barrier by the change in fundamental law which the Segregation Cases
decreed, and a new range of possibilities has opened to them.”188
The lessons of history had long been the proud terrain of Jim Crow’s
defenders, who argued that white supremacy, in belief and practice, was an
unchanging heritage of southern life. These lessons were now being challenged.
Civil rights advocates found history to be valuable ground through which they
could demonstrate that prejudice was not permanently embedded in southern
society, and, more consequentially for postwar civil rights, that laws had been
particularly effective at shaping personal beliefs, and thereby remaking race
relations.
IV. THE TRIUMPH OF FAITH IN THE LAW: THE ROAD TO BROWN
The old alibi that you have to educate the people first and do the
right thing afterward has now been exploded by the Supreme Court. 189
The claim that law was uniquely suited to addressing America’s racial
dilemma received extensive support in the debate over school segregation that
culminated in Brown. When, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, school
desegregation litigation emerged as the next major civil rights battleground,
opponents regularly conceded that civil rights legislation might be appropriate. If a
state wanted to desegregate its schools, critics allowed, it certainly could do so.
And perhaps Congress could pass a federal law desegregating schools. But they
186
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drew the line when civil rights advocates argued that school segregation was
wrong not just as a policy matter, but as a constitutional matter—and therefore the
issue was one for the federal courts. Critics of judicial leadership in dismantling
Jim Crow drew on several principles. They argued that such a social
transformation was a political issue, and it was a violation of democratic principles
for unelected judges to initiate such a monumental social upheaval.190 They also
argued the legal merits of the constitutional claim, noting that the history behind
the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment gave little indication that it was
intended to prohibit segregated schools,191 and further, there was too much
precedent for the Court to change course at this point.192 These critics also had a
final, powerful argument in their arsenal—an argument historians of Brown have
largely overlooked: they were deeply skeptical of the capacity of the law to
dismantle Jim Crow.
Those opposing judicial intervention argued that a legal pronouncement, even
by an institution as esteemed as the highest court of the land, without sufficient
support on the ground, would be ineffective, perhaps even counterproductive. Here
was a test of the capacity of the law in its barest form: could the mere words of the
Supreme Court—which was, after all, the “least dangerous branch,” in Alexander
Hamilton’s famous estimation, having “neither Force nor Will, but merely
judgment”193—lead to the abandonment of segregated schools, the centerpiece of
modern Jim Crow? By the early 1950s, with the Supreme Court sending
unmistakably promising signals that the Justices were willing to confront this
issue, racial liberals would focus their energies on this crucial question with
renewed intensity. The NAACP lawyers who pressed the school desegregation
cases drew extensively upon the scholarship and claims of racial legalism. And the
Justices of the Supreme Court would show considerable sympathy toward the
legalist claims. Although the Justices never embraced the high optimism toward
the capacity of the law of committed postwar racial liberals, these arguments
influenced the Court, helping to quell the Justices’ fears that the judiciary lacked
the power to press the desegregation project forward into this potentially explosive
area.
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A. The Skeptics’ Case
Those who continued to voice resistance toward civil rights reform generally
based their position on a combination of pessimism toward the state of race
relations and skepticism toward the capacity of the law, particularly when new
legal requirements derive from the judicial (as opposed to the legislative) process.
While the harsh, dismissive pessimism of the early Jim Crow era had dissipated,
echoes of Plessy and Sumner would still be heard in the postwar period.
A representative summary of the skeptics’ position can be found in a 1950
opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
evaluating a challenge to federal segregation law applying to the District of
Columbia.194 The court framed the legal question as “whether the Constitution
lifted this problem [i.e., segregation] out of the hands of all legislatures and settled
it,” to which it concluded that the Constitution did not.195 To support this
conclusion, the opinion shifted from constitutional analysis to an evaluation of the
sociology of race relations and the power of legal change.
Since the beginning of human history, no circumstance has given rise to
more difficult and delicate problems than has the coexistence of different
races in the same area. Centuries of bitter experience in all parts of the
world have proved that the problem is insoluble by force of any sort. The
same history shows that it is soluble by the patient processes of
community experience.196
Thus, civil rights reform, when not produced by majoritarian processes, is nothing
more than “force” (equating federal law with “force” was a standard move of the
skeptics), which, following the folkways assumptions, cannot change social
practices that are built upon attitudes; this was a job for education, for “the patient
processes of community experience.” Although this reasoning appears at least
sympathetic to the Sumnerian skepticism toward all legal reform that runs against
folkways, the court added that its argument was against judicial intervention, not
against law per se. “Such problems lie naturally in the field of legislation, a method
susceptible of experimentation, of development, of adjustment to the current
necessities in a variety of community circumstance.”197 This was the folkways
school in its modern form. It attempted to steer the debate over the capacity of the
law into an institutional competency discussion. Thus, the crucial question for the
postwar struggle over the capacity of the law would largely revolve around a
debate over the capacity of the courts.
The fact that the debate was about schools also gave ammunition to these
latter-day Sumnerians. Skeptics regularly stressed the special place of education in
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the social system as a justification for giving latitude to states to allow school
assignment policy to reflect local customs. Compulsory school laws, “provide[]
that the school shall supplement the work of the parent in the training of the child
and in doing so it is entering a delicate field and one fraught with tensions and
difficulties,” explained a 1951 federal district court opinion that rejected a
constitutional challenge to segregated schools in South Carolina.198
[T]he law must take account, not merely of the matter of affording
instruction to the student, but also of the wishes of the parent as to the
upbringing of the child and his associates in the formative period of
childhood and adolescence. If public education is to have the support of
the people through their legislatures, it must not go contrary to what they
deem for the best interests of their children.199
This approach to education echoed the late-nineteenth-century belief that schools
belonged to a “social” (as opposed to “civil” or “political”) sphere, into which
federal constitutional norms should not enter.200
The Supreme Court was given ample opportunity to weigh the claims of the
skeptics, for this was a central element of the arguments the states offered in
defending their segregation statutes in Brown. During oral argument John W.
Davis, attorney for South Carolina, emphasized the importance of allowing school
practices to reflect social customs.
Is it not of all the activities of government the one which most nearly
approaches the hearts and minds of people, the question of education of
their young?
Is it not the height of wisdom that the manner in which that shall be
conducted should be left to those most immediately affected by it, and
that the wishes of the parents, both white and colored, should be
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ascertained before their children are forced into what may be an
unwelcome contact?201
Similarly, the Virginia Attorney General laid out his vision of the negative impact
a desegregation ruling would have, in language echoing Sumnerian folkways
principles. Such a decision would be “contrary to the customs, the traditions and
the mores of what we might claim to be a great people, established through
generations, who themselves are fiercely and irrevocably dedicated to the
preservation of the white and colored races.”202
The claims of the legal skeptics were also the concerns of the Supreme Court
Justices. As they considered whether to take the momentous step of striking down
segregated education as in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the last thing
the Justices wanted to do was to issue a decision that was ignored. They feared
what Holmes had warned against in Giles—a decision that proved no more than an
“empty form.”203 “[N]othing would be worse, from my point of view,” warned
Justice Frankfurter during oral arguments in Brown, “than for this Court to make
an abstract declaration that segregation is bad and then have it evaded by tricks.”204
Or, an even worse outcome would be to issue a decision that ignited the South.
“[I]t is generally recognized,” observed a 1952 law review note, “that the Court
avoids a per se ruling because it is reluctant to cause social revolution by judicial
fiat.”205 The Justices of the Court were paying careful attention to developments in
race relations and the achievements of civil rights campaigns, and they were all
impressed at the progress that was being made.206 If they were to strike down
segregated schools, they would have to believe that the decision would contribute
to this already well-developed trend away from Jim Crow.
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B. The Racial Liberals’ Case
As the NAACP lawyers prepared their legal challenge to school segregation,
they found much support for their positions, particularly their optimistic
assessments of the potential for federal civil rights reform, in recent legal and
social scientific scholarship. The civil rights lawyers highlighted studies that
emphasized that a Supreme Court desegregation ruling would not be particularly
explosive in the South. Because of social and cultural changes already under way
(encouraged by previous civil rights reforms), combined with a belief that topdown legal commands could be effective in the area of race relations, racial
liberals had high hopes for the effects of a revision of formal federal law. They
believed the Supreme Court could provide the critical intervention that would
allow the nation to finally abandon Jim Crow policy, practices, and beliefs.
The case for the capacity of the law in the context of school desegregation
was built upon at least a decade of civil rights accomplishments. These included
the Supreme Court decision in the white primary case of 1944,207 the desegregation
of the military by executive order in 1948,208 and the 1950 Supreme Court
decisions holding that the separate-but-equal principle established in Plessy no
longer satisfied the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment when applied to
university education.209 Each of these civil rights milestones offered a new
opportunity to restate the case for the law in the battle for racial equality. For
example, William H. Hastie wrote an article evaluating the white primary decision
in which he noted: “For the student of statecraft Smith v. Allwright provides
occasion for fresh discussion of the wisdom and efficacy of judicial decisions
which impose sanctions contrary to what seems to be the immediate will and desire
of large segments of the population.”210 Although the decision was greeted with
defiance and ominous warnings by segregationists, “[n]ow, a year later, after the
hue and cry have subsided, it is noteworthy that only South Carolina has been
moved to undertake legislative nullification of the judicial mandate.”211 Hastie
continued,
it now can be stated with confidence that the declaration of the law in
Smith v. Allwright is in fact serving to stimulate public acceptance of the
Negro as a voter. Prejudice against permitting the Negro to vote is
proving not to be so deep seated and widespread as to cause, on any
dangerous or alarming scale, more than a vocal challenge to the authority
207
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of the national government. To put the matter somewhat differently, the
nation is strong enough and its people are sufficiently civilized so that
such pronouncement by our highest Court can and does serve as a
catalyst of supporting sentiment rather than an incitation to rebellion.212
Similar assessments emerged in the wake of Truman’s military desegregation order
and the higher education rulings. In 1949, sociologist Arnold M. Rose (who had
worked closely with Gunnar Myrdal in the preparation of An American Dilemma)
published an article in Common Ground, titled “‘You Can’t Legislate Against
Prejudice’—Or Can You?” in which he summarized what appeared to be an
emerging scholarly consensus: “A significant amount of evidence has become
available to indicate that the attitude of prejudice, or at least the practice of
discrimination, can be substantially reduced by authoritative order.”213
By the early 1950s, when the NAACP brought their challenge to grade school
segregation to the Supreme Court, racial liberal ideology pervaded scholarly and
popular literature. In 1952, for instance, the Yale Law Journal published a student
note that concluded: “An examination of the available evidence makes it doubtful
that major violence would accompany educational desegregation.”214 Peaceful
desegregation was already taking place, much of it by legal compulsion. As
support, the Note looked to judicially led efforts to end white primaries and
segregation in higher education:
These instances of southern adjustment to enforced desegregation
strongly suggest that the normal reaction of the South to Supreme Court
decisions is not violence. Generally, the only resistance takes the form of
attempted circumvention. Tighter decrees and persistent enforcement
ultimately overcome even this type of resistance. Thus there is little
reason for the courts to allow threats of violence and civil strife to delay
desegregation.215
212
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This note was carefully read by many involved in Brown litigation; it was cited in
an NAACP brief and in an influential bench memo by one of Chief Justice
Warren’s clerks.216
As soon as the school segregation cases began to reach the Supreme Court in
1951, leading civil rights activists sought to assure anyone who would listen that a
desegregation order would not lead to major disturbances, and that the entire
process, following the path set by military and higher education integration, would
be smoother than expected. Racial segregation in southern schools was already
“fading away,” observed Clarence Mitchell, the head of the Washington, D.C.,
branch of the NAACP.217 When asked for his prediction of the impact of a
Supreme Court school desegregation ruling, Mitchell replied:
The whole thing would go well. There would be no problem. I get
around quite a lot in the Southern communities. The South more and
more is getting into a mental state where it knows that segregation must
go in almost everything. With this attitude, segregation sort of fades
away.218
The NAACP journal the Crisis dismissed predictions of violence in reaction to
Court-ordered desegregation, citing as evidence the success of the higher education
cases and the “high respect” of the American people for the Supreme Court.219 In
early 1954, as the Court deliberated on Brown, Thurgood Marshall stated that a
favorable Court ruling would mean most schools could be integrated in four or five
years (although he added, in a rare and surprising display of pessimism probably
intended to assuage lingering fears of upheavals, that in isolated sections of the
Deep South such a ruling “would have no effect for thirty years”).220 The New York
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Times reported Marshall’s comments under the headline: “‘Upheaval’ Doubted If
School Bias Ended.”221
The claims of the racial liberals steadily seeped into mainstream discussions
on the fate of Jim Crow. “Segregation has been legally disintegrating under one
court decision after another,” observed a 1953 New York Times editorial.222
Impressive strides were being made within higher education, and “the legal issue
has descended to the public schools by a logical sequence of events.”223 There
were “risks” involved when a change in law is placed in opposition to “mores and
social practices . . . [y]et change in race relations in the South . . . has been swift in
recent years.”224 The editorial concluded:
The Supreme Court will render its decision on segregation in the
public schools in a climate of growing tolerance that is one of the most
heartening signs of our times. The climate suggests that, whatever the
decision of the court may be, democracy has nothing to fear from more
democracy.225
This editorial is particularly notable because it marked a transformation of the
position of the Times editorial board. The Times had given a far more measured
reaction to the 1950 decisions desegregating higher education, praising the Court
for not moving too quickly: “[A]s long as considerable numbers of people,
including the majority of dominant elements in whole communities, think
differently, we cannot expect the millennium. The situation calls for a period of
education—how long a period no one can say.”226 In just three years, the
newspaper had gone from opposing a school desegregation decision in favor of “a
period of education” to accepting, even inviting such a decision.
The NAACP lawyers recognized the potential for their cause in extrapolating
examples of civil rights success stories to the issue of grade school segregation.
When they argued their case before the Court, the civil rights lawyers had to do
more than just present a convincing interpretation of the Constitution that would
support their position. And they had to do more than just convince the Justices of
the wrongness of segregation. They also had to paint a picture of what the country
would look like after Plessy was overturned. And their picture was relentlessly
sanguine.
221
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The social scientific studies referenced in the NAACP briefs included not just
references to the damage segregation inflicted on black children (the material that
eventually found its way into the famous eleventh footnote of the Brown opinion),
but also to the malleability of prejudices in the face of outside stimulus.227
Attached to one NAACP brief was an appendix entitled, “The Effects of
Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation: A Social Science
Statement.”228 In summarizing the anticipated consequences of a desegregation
order, the statement echoed the characteristic optimism of racial liberals:
“desegregation has been carried out successfully in a variety of situations although
outbreaks of violence had been commonly predicted.”229 It specifically noted
successes with desegregation in the military, housing, and industry and referenced
the latest studies supporting the racial liberal adherence to racial contact theory.230
In 1953 the Journal of Social Issues dedicated an entire issue to a presentation of
research that social psychologist Kenneth Clark compiled during his work with the
NAACP lawyers in the segregation cases.231 The focus of this article was not on
his research demonstrating the damages of segregation (Clark’s famous doll
studies232), but on his work evaluating the potential impact of a school
desegregation order. Clark argued that although experience had demonstrated that
there were necessary preconditions to successful integration—including, most
notably, strong leadership—wide-scale mandatory integration was feasible. He
concluded, “when desegregation takes place it is generally evaluated, even by
those who [were ] initially skeptical, as successful and is seen as increasing rather
than decreasing social stability.”233
The points Thurgood Marshall made during the first round of oral arguments
in Brown also emphasized a faith in the capacity of the law.234 Marshall pointed to
previous judicial interventions on matters of civil rights, specifically the white
primary and higher education decisions, as evidence of the power of the Court:
[T]he record shows . . . that all of these predictions of things that were
going to happen [riots, organized resistance, etc.], they have never
happened. And I for one do not believe that the people in South Carolina
or those southern states are lawless people.
227
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Every single time that this Court has ruled, they [i.e., white
southerners] have obeyed it, and I for one believe that rank and file
people in the South will support whatever decision in this case is handed
down. . . .
....
. . . [P]eople have grown up and understand each other. They are
fighting together and living together.235
Marshall explained that he did “not think that segregation in public schools is
any more ingrained in the South than segregation in transportation,”236 an area in
which the Court had already made significant desegregation rulings.237 The real
problem of segregation, he contended, was “the state-imposed part of it”238—that
is, the segregation laws were the fundamental problem, more than the fact of
segregation itself. And in a dramatic exchange with Justice Reed, who wondered if
segregation might be justified as a way to maintain order,239 Marshall left the Court
with this hopeful image:
I know in the South where I spent most of my time, you will see white
and colored kids going down the road together to school. They separate
and go to different schools, and they come out and they play together. I
do not see why there would necessarily be any trouble if they went to
school together.240
C. The Brown Court
Each Justice came to support the desegregation decision through his own path
of reasoning and conscience. But certain common themes emerged from the
Justices’ deliberation process. All nine men were clearly aware of the changes in
social attitudes and scientific findings on race. This was particularly true of those
Justices who struggled most with the decision. Considering the strong
integrationist tenor of most of these scholarly works, such study undoubtedly
exerted pressure to support desegregation. With some exceptions, the Justices of
the Supreme Court accepted the basic premises of the racial liberal argument: that
235
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racial attitudes were not set in stone and that they had shown significant
improvement in recent years; and that civil rights laws could be effective even in
the face of initial popular resistance.
On matters of civil rights, the Justices were constantly looking to social
developments beyond the Court. Felix Frankfurter and Stanley Reed carefully
assembled extensive files of material on segregation and civil rights reform,
pouring over the latest developments and findings. Law professor Herbert
Wechsler captured this interest in a scene he described about visiting Justice Reed
in his office while the Justices were deliberating on the segregation cases. “There
he was sitting behind a big desk . . . and all over were spread magazines and
journals of psychiatry and psychology,” Wechsler recalled. “He looked a little
weary, and he pointed to the whole batch and asked, ‘You know anything about
discrimination?’”241
Of course, simply engaging with recent liberal scholarship was different from
embracing its claims. Not all were convinced. Of all the Justices on the Brown
Court, Robert Jackson was probably the most antagonistic toward basic racial
liberal assumptions. “You can’t cure this situation by putting children together,”242
he told his colleagues in the conference following the first round of oral arguments
in the school segregation cases, thereby caricaturing and dismissing a central claim
of racial contact theory. In his unpublished concurring opinion in Brown, Jackson
wrote that courts “cannot eradicate” the “fears, prides and prejudices” that support
segregation.243
This Court, in common with courts everywhere, has recognized the force
of long custom and has been reluctant to use judicial power to try to
recast social usages established among the people. . . . Today’s decision
is to uproot a custom deeply embedded not only in state statutes but in
the habit and usage of people in their local communities.244
From this he concluded, “in embarking upon a widespread reform of social
customs and habits of countless communities, we must face the limitations on
the nature and effectiveness of the judicial process.”245
Jackson also drew attention to an irony inherent in the reasoning behind the
legal attack on segregation. Racial liberals criticized Plessy for its faulty reasoning
that laws were powerless to change social habits. Yet a strong argument could be
made that the failure of Plessy was actually a product of the basic correctness of
241
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Board of Education Collection, Series 1, Box 5, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale
University, New Haven, Conn.
242
THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, 1940–1985, at 652 (Del Dickson ed., 2001)
[hereinafter IN CONFERENCE].
243
Memorandum from Mr. Justice Jackson 2 (Mar. 15, 1954), Robert H. Jackson
Papers, Container 184, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
244
Id. at 9–10.
245
Id. at 12.

2008]

LAW’S CAPACITY & BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

1537

this proposition. The legal requirement in the 1896 ruling was that segregated
facilities were constitutionally acceptable as long as they were equal, yet this
requirement, announced from the apex of the American legal system, was
systematically ignored. Law had failed—and failed miserably—to do what racial
liberals insisted it had the power to do. Jackson highlighted this fact in his
concurrence: “I see no reason to expect a pronouncement that segregation is
unconstitutional will be any more self-executing or any more efficiently executed
than our pronouncement that unequal facilities are unconstitutional.”246 This
inconvenient fact received only occasional mention among supporters of
desegregation.247
Hugo Black also expressed reservations about the legalist assumptions that
dominated discussions of civil rights reform. While committed to overruling
Plessy, he also played the role of the Court’s Cassandra. During the Justices’
conferences, the Alabama Justice frequently aired his skepticism regarding
compliance in the South to a federal court order. He even predicted that violence
would result from a desegregation order. In 1950, when there was some discussion
among the Justices regarding the difficulties of issuing a desegregation order that
applied to higher education but not public schools, Black told his colleagues, “At
this time, it might make trouble in the South in the lower schools. Schools would
close rather than mix races at the grade and high school levels.”248 Even a move
against segregation in higher education might result in “clashes.”249 In 1952, when
the Justices first squarely faced school desegregation, his predictions were even
more dire. “[T]here may be violence if [the] Court holds segregation unlawful . . . .
[S]tates would probably take evasive measures while purporting to obey.”250 Of all
the Justices, Black was probably the least aware of, or the least interested in, the
ongoing debate over the capacity of the law to change race relations.
Yet Black’s influence on his fellow Justices was limited. As the only voice of
the Deep South, the Justices obviously listened to his predictions with particular
interest. But the fact that few of the Justices echoed Black’s estimation of the
likely results of a ruling (and at least one openly took issue with Black’s
predictions), indicates that they had other, more influential voices sending quite
246
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different signals. Jackson, who expressed such skepticism toward the tenets of
racial legalism, was generally optimistic that civil rights progress was taking place
and would continue to take place. The Supreme Court, he assumed, would
eventually have to follow that trend.251 Even Reed, the last holdout in Brown,
recognized the clear direction of change on civil rights. In 1949 Reed wrote a
personal memorandum in which he noted (with some resignation): “It may be that
segregation is not a lasting condition. It may be an exception of the moment in the
movement toward abolition of all distinctions of people by law.”252 During the
Court’s deliberation on Brown, he had his clerks researching the latest trends in
civil rights policy.253 In oral arguments, after listening to Marshall’s optimistic
assessment of southern race relations and prediction for a smooth transition to
integration, Reed responded, “I am not thinking of trouble.”254 His concern was
whether the federal courts should be getting involved in this issue.255
Despite Black’s relentless pessimism, and Jackson’s quieter skepticism, the
dominant attitude among the Justices confronting school desegregation was one of
hopefulness. The efforts of racial liberals to redefine the grounds on which racial
reform was discussed, to inject confidence into the campaign for federal civil
rights policies, and to move the powerful liberal establishment toward the tenets of
racial liberalism was, by the early 1950s, largely successful. The Brown ruling
emerged from this atmosphere of optimism. With the exception of Black, the
Justices underestimated the potential for organized resistance to their
desegregation order. “The Court expected some resistance from the South,”
Warren later wrote in his memoirs. “But I doubt if any of us expected as much as
we got.”256 Justice Burton noted: “There is a trend away from separation of the
races in restaurants, the armed forces, and so forth.”257 He also saw a clear line of
progression from the higher education decisions to Brown.258 In a direct counter to
Black’s insistence on the problems that a desegregation decision would create in
the South, Justice Minton asserted: “There may be trouble in the offing, but I doubt
it.”259 He supported this assessment by pointing to the successful integration of the
military.260 He also drew on his own experience in Indiana, where, in his
estimation, “segregation is on its way out.”261
251
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By far, the most persistent proponent of racial liberal optimism on the Court
was Frankfurter. Frankfurter was in the midst of his own battle between his
commitment to the doctrine of judicial restraint (which led him to consider school
desegregation an issue better left to legislatures) and his lifelong opposition to
racial discrimination and segregation. If Frankfurter were to abandon judicial
restraint in this particular case, it would be the product of not only his belief in the
wrongness of segregation, but also his assessment of the readiness of American
society to accept a judicial desegregation ruling. His central concern was to protect
the Court, which he saw as an inherently fragile institution whose authority was
largely dependent on its prestige in the national consciousness, from becoming
politicized and, as a result, weakened. According to Philip Elman, one of the
Justice’s close correspondents during this period, Frankfurter “was waiting for
public opinion to form; he was waiting for the effects of the Court’s decisions in
Henderson, Sweatt, and McLaurin to be felt; he was waiting for some movement
outside the court system toward racial integration.”262
To measure the public mood, Frankfurter had his clerks track down
information on the latest developments of various integration efforts, and the
reports he received indicated that the integration process was going smoothly.263
Extrapolating from integration success stories in the border states, Frankfurter
convinced himself that the South was also moving in a promising direction. He
prided himself on his contacts with lawyers in the South (most of whom were
former students of his), and the impression that Frankfurter gained from these
contacts was that the South was prepared to accept a Supreme Court desegregation
ruling.264
When Warren arrived, Frankfurter immediately pressed his optimistic
assessment of the changing dynamics of race relations on the new Chief Justice.
Frankfurter would prove a particularly influential voice for Warren as he
approached the task of writing the Brown opinion. In a memorandum written in the
262
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summer of 1952 and passed on to Warren when he arrived on the Court,
Frankfurter noted: “The policy of segregation has in the short period of thirty years
undergone great modification. . . . [I]t is fair to say that the pace of progress has
surprised even those most eager in its promotion.”265 This fact was central to
Frankfurter’s reasoning in the case:
The legal problem confronting this Court is the extent to which this
desirable and even necessary process of welding a nation out of such
diverse elements can be imposed as a matter of law upon the States in
disregard of the deeply rooted feeling and tradition, based upon local
situations, to the contrary.266
This hurdle could be overcome through either a reevaluation of the role of the
Court (of the capacity of the law, essentially) or a reevaluation of the extent of
opposition to the proposed Court ruling—or some combination of the two, toward
which Frankfurter was working. Not only was the practice of segregation changing
but also the beliefs that accompanied this arrangement. “Law must respond to
transformation of views as well as to that of outward circumstances. The effect of
changes in men’s feelings for what is right and just is equally relevant in
determining whether differentiation of treatment by law is a denial of ‘the equal
protection of the laws.’”267 In the months leading up the ruling, Frankfurter gave an
article to Warren that had recently been published in the Washington Post. The
article, titled “Virginia Has Lost Alarm at Racial Ruling,” explained that a school
desegregation decision “is awaited in Virginia with grave anxiety, but without
anything resembling hysteria.”268 Warren returned the article with a note, dated
May 4, 1954, that read: “Felix: This is a splendid and encouraging article. I
enjoyed our discussion yesterday. It was extremely helpful to me.”269
Warren’s political background predisposed him to share Frankfurter’s
optimism toward the trend of American race relations. He came to the Court after
serving a decade as a popular governor of California, and he brought with him an
understanding of how the previous decade had transformed race relations as a
matter of politics and public policy. His background in California politics gave him
a sense of optimism about the progress of race relations. Following a federal
appeals court decision striking down a California school district’s policy of
separately educating children of Mexican descent,270 the California legislature
265
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passed, and Governor Warren signed, a bill prohibiting school segregation in the
state.271 Thus, with judicial prodding and strikingly little fanfare or controversy,
California discarded legal segregation in its schools. California saw another major
civil rights ruling when, in 1948, the California Supreme Court ventured into a
field that the U.S. Supreme Court would not hazard until the late 1960s and ruled
unconstitutional the state’s miscegenation statute—the first time that any court,
state or federal, had done so.272 By the time Warren left California, he had already
taken part in a civil rights project that was not overly controversial within his home
state, and whose successes, he felt, had resulted from a combination of leadership,
political skill, and moderation.273
Warren’s Brown opinion included a reference to the importance of law in
creating the harmful environment the Court was striking down as unconstitutional.
Warren quoted from the finding of fact of the district court decision in Brown,274
which had concluded that the damages segregation inflicted on black children “is
greater when it has the sanction of the law.”275 This lower court finding, in turn,
had apparently drawn on expert testimony of psychologist Louisa Pinkham Holt,
who had explained:
The fact that it is enforced, that it is legal, I think, has more importance
than the mere fact of segregation by itself does because this gives legal
and official sanction to a policy which is inevitably interpreted both by
white people and by Negroes as denoting the inferiority of the Negro
group.276
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The Court’s approach to drafting the desegregation opinions reflected an
underlying confidence in the efficacy of legal rules, even in the volatile area of
southern race relations. Justice Clark, who tended to echo Black’s dire warnings of
what a desegregation decision would do to the South, noted that “[t]here is a
danger of violence if this is not well handled.”277 This was a warning that the
implementation should be done carefully, a point on which all the Justices were in
agreement. But this concession, even as limited as it was, was significant. The fact
that most of the Justices thought that a properly worded, preferably unanimous
opinion could be effective, that it could follow in the footsteps of the white
primary and higher education decisions, was a critical step in the creation of
Brown. “Whether one approves or disapproves” of the segregation decisions, noted
two social scientists in 1955, “it is clear that the court has undertaken a
monumental project in the field of social engineering, and one obviously based on
the assumption that morality can be legislated.”278 Brown reflected a sea change in
assumptions within mainstream policy discourse toward the prospects of civil
rights laws to change social practices and attitudes—a transformation that was the
culmination of at least a decade of efforts by proponents of racial liberal ideology.
D. The Implementation Decision
Initially at least, developments on the ground following the 1954
desegregation decision did little to disabuse the Justices or the civil rights lawyers
and their supporters of their optimistic assessment of the prospects for
desegregation. Contrary to the predictions of many segregationists, Brown did not
spark an immediate backlash. In fact, initial reactions to the ruling were generally
promising. The day after Brown, the New York Times reported that “[l]eading
American educators . . . . did not believe there would be great difficulty in putting

________________________
Brief for Appellants at 9, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Appendix
to Appellants Briefs at 9, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (“[S]egregation
gives official recognition and sanction to these other factors of the social complex, and
thereby enhances the effects of the latter in created the awareness of social status
differences and feelings of inferiority. The child who, for example, is compelled to attend a
segregated school may be able to cope with ordinary expressions of prejudice by regarding
the prejudiced person as evil or misguided; but he cannot readily cope with symbols of
authority, the full force of the authority of the State—the school or the school board, in this
instance—in the same manner. Given both the ordinary expression of prejudice and the
school's policy of segregation, the former takes on greater force and seemingly becomes an
official expression of the latter.” (internal footnotes omitted)); Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 3, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), (“[R]acial
discriminations imposed by law, or having the sanction or support of government,
inevitably tend to undermine the foundations of a society dedicated to freedom, justice, and
equality.”).
277
IN CONFERENCE, supra note 248, at 659 (emphasis added).
278
Roche & Gordon, supra note 128, at 229.

2008]

LAW’S CAPACITY & BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

1543

the ruling into effect . . . . No one expected any violence nor any real crisis to
develop. A gradual changeover from the present system to a nonsegregated policy
was predicted.”279 The newspaper also ran an article summarizing the work of
psychologist Kenneth Clark, who found desegregation occurring peacefully, even
in places with “deeply rooted prejudices.”280 Key to success, Clark noted, was the
perception that the tide of opinion was shifting: “even deeply prejudiced persons
went along with desegregation when they saw it was accepted by others in the
community.”281 A Washington Post editorial explained, “The decision will prove,
we are sure—whatever transient difficulties it may create and whatever irritations
it may arouse—a profoundly healthy and healing one. It will serve—and
speedily—to close an ancient wound too long allowed to fester.”282 Now the
outcome was clear, declared C. Vann Woodward in his lectures at the University
of Virginia in the fall of 1954. “A unanimous decision, it has all the moral and
legal authority of the Supreme Court behind it, and it is unthinkable that it can be
indefinitely evaded.”283 Similarly, Channing H. Tobias, chairman of the NAACP
board of directors, told a meeting of black leaders soon after Brown that “the entire
South will meet the test of the Supreme Court decision in the spirit of loyal, lawabiding citizens.”284
This optimism, when translated into proposals for implementing school
desegregation, pointed in two different directions. It encouraged the NAACP legal
team to push an uncharacteristically aggressive line in its briefs and oral arguments
on the implementation decree, arguing for “immediate” or “forthwith”
desegregation. Throughout the school litigation campaign, the NAACP lawyers
had proven themselves exceptionally adept at taking the temperature of public and
judicial sentiment, steering their litigation strategy to coincide with this sentiment,
279
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and keeping themselves ready to adjust their tactics to take advantage of new
openings when opinion developed in favorable directions. As a result, the NAACP
campaign had two defining characteristics: it tended toward pragmatism and, at
times, caution; and it was overwhelmingly successful at winning major cases in the
Supreme Court. Yet the lawyers’ approach to the implementation decision,
influenced by the heady atmosphere created by their great victory in the 1954
decision, broke from their traditional caution.285
In rallying around the principle of forthwith desegregation, the NAACP
lawyers emphasized in their arguments for Brown II the promising changes that
were already taking place. Marshall noted that “it matters not whether that firm
hand is executive, legislative or judicial,” concluding that “the district court, once
properly instructed by this Court, will be the type of firm hand.”286 “I have no
doubt whatsoever,” he told the Court, “that the people in South Carolina and North
Carolina, once the law is made clear, will comply with whatever that court [the
Fourth Circuit] does.”287 The white primary cases 288 had “raised terrific racial
feeling and it worked out.”289 In the higher education cases,290 state attorneys
general had predicted catastrophe and “not a single prediction came true.”291
Within the twelve states that had made efforts to fall in line with the Court’s
holding in these earlier cases, there was “only one untoward incident.”292 The
desegregation of interstate transportation facilities resulting from the 1950
Henderson decision had similarly beneficial results.293 Despite the “dire
predictions” that the railroad industry would collapse in the South, the ruling
resulted in “less trouble than we had before.”294 Whenever faced with a major
social problem, Marshall told the Justices, “the history of our Government shows
that it is the inherent faith in our democratic process that gets us through, the faith
that the people in the South are no different from anybody else as to being lawabiding.”295
285
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In their written brief, the NAACP lawyers pressed their case for an aggressive
legal mandate even more forcefully; and they again drew directly on the legalist
position.
The underlying assumption—that change in attitude must precede change
in action—is itself at best a highly questionable one. There is a
considerable body of evidence to indicate that attitude may itself be
influenced by situation and that, where the situation demands that an
individual act as if he were not prejudiced, he will so act, despite the
continuance, at least temporarily, of the prejudice. We submit that this
Court can itself contribute to an effective and decisive change in attitude
by insistence that the present unlawful situation be changed forthwith.296
To support this point, the NAACP cited a list of studies of integration efforts
in the military, housing, sports, and schools.297
The NAACP lawyers did not get what they wanted. In its implementation
ruling, the Supreme Court gave control of desegregation to the lower federal courts
without strict deadlines.298 The Justices’ refusal to adopt timetables for integration,
however, was not necessarily because they saw the prospects for a successful
implementation of the decision in a dramatically different light than the civil rights
lawyers. Indeed, the Court (with the vocal exception of Justice Black) was largely
responding to the same optimism that guided the NAACP. Yet the Justices came to
a quite different conclusion as to what this faith in the command of the law meant
for framing an implementation policy.
When considering the implementation decision, a sharp split developed
between Justice Black and the other justices over the likely impact of the ruling in
the Deep South. Black continued to say what he had been saying for some time
now: the South was going to revolt. He warned “[s]ome counties won’t have
Negroes and whites in the same school this generation. . . . We have no more
chance to enforce this in the Deep South than to enforce Prohibition in New York
City . . . . It is futile to think that in these cases we can settle the question of
segregation in the South.”299 Black proposed that the Court avoid treating the cases
as class actions on behalf of all black children in segregated schools and limit the
holding to the named plaintiffs in the case,300 a remarkable concession for a Justice
who was such a strong proponent within the Court for the ruling in the first place.
Douglas was the only other justice who thought this approach a good one.301
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The other Justices, however, refused to agree with this pessimistic assessment
of the prospects for desegregation—a point scholars have failed to fully
appreciate.302 None of the Justices had any illusions about the process being easy,
but Black had been playing the Cassandra role in all previous civil rights cases,
and thus far events had largely proven him mistaken. Philip Elman, who was in
close contact with Frankfurter during this time, noted that Black was “scaring the
shit out of the justices, especially Frankfurter and Jackson, who didn’t know how
the Court could enforce a ruling against Plessy.”303 The process of deliberating
over implementation led many to envision the difficulty of the process of making
desegregation work. As Frankfurter put it, a “declaration of unconstitutionality is
not a wand by which these transformations can be accomplished.”304 The Justices
found themselves face to face with the potential of opposition in the oral
arguments for the implementation decision during which attorneys for the states
warned of the challenges desegregation would face.305 “Without a favorable
community attitude, no satisfactory adjustment is possible,” explained a lawyer for
Virginia.306 Yet—and here is the key point—most of the Justices remained
generally hopeful that the momentum for change was already established and that
the power of the Court’s voice, if its words were carefully chosen, would continue
to move the issue forward.
Thus, the same faith in the power of the law that had mobilized racial liberals
was evident among the Justices as they attempted to imagine the reaction to their
decision. The Justices (save Black) thought that a well-written decision, one that
effectively balanced assertion and flexibility, would be critical to the success of
implementation. Justice Reed, who struggled more than anyone to join the first
Brown decision, began his comments in the conference of December 1953 by
noting, “I have a firm belief that there is a considerable group wanting to give this
decision sympathetic consideration. When some schools are opened, it will have a
further effect.”307 Although the Justice from Kentucky recognized the potential for
localized defiance (“our order may result in public schools being abolished”), he
302

See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL
SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961, 217, 220–21, 228–31 (1994) (treating the fears
expressed by Justice Black as representative of the general mood of the Court).
303
Interview by Richard Kluger with Philip Elman (Aug. 19, 1971), Brown v. Board
of Education Collection, Series 1, Box 2, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University, New
Haven, Conn.; see also Elman, supra note 262, at 828.
304
Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Brethren of the Supreme Court of the
United States (Jan. 15, 1954), Earl Warren Papers, Container 571, Manuscripts Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
305
See, e.g., ARGUMENT, supra note 191, at 433 (Virginia’s Attorney General
describing “the sudden shock entailed by the uprooting and demolishing of a way of life
enshrined and institutionalized in the hearts and minds of the overwhelming majority of
millions of law-abiding citizens, their fierce and deepseated devotion to their customs and
traditions composing as they do, the warp and woof of their mores of life . . .”).
306
Id. at 425.
307
IN CONFERENCE, supra note 248, at 666–67.
AND THE

2008]

LAW’S CAPACITY & BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

1547

concluded on an optimistic note: “The border states will be examples.”308
Frankfurter too insisted on the critical importance of careful leadership by the
Court: “What we do is largely educational.”309 Dismissing pessimistic findings of
polls conducted in segregated states, Frankfurter joined Reed in his predicting that
the entire South would eventually fall into line: “By gradual infiltration of border
states, the process of desegregation can spread to the Deep South.”310 Justice Clark
agreed with Frankfurter on the importance of desegregation outside the Deep
South. “Texas is not going to present many acute problems,” the Texan told his
fellow Justices.311 “[T]here will not be too much trouble there.”312 There would be
pockets of resistance and some administrative concerns, but he felt that a gradual
remedy would be effective.313
In the face of the massive resistance that soon took shape, the idea that a wellreasoned, carefully crafted opinion might be effective in significantly mollifying
opposition to desegregation appears, in a word, quaint. The mobilized opposition,
when it took shape, would have little concern for the Court’s niceties. Yet the fact
that this view dominated the Justices’ understanding of what they were
undertaking was a testament to the exaggerated sense of importance the Justices
held toward the Court—and, more generally, toward the power of the law. This
was a lesson that a generation of racial liberals had been insistently trying to
promulgate to the rest of the nation. In this effort, they had been remarkably
successful.
The deep-seated commitment to the guiding force of the law held by
committed racial liberals is given graphic illustration by Thurgood Marshall’s
reaction to Brown II. Although he did not get the immediate desegregation with
strict timetables he had asked for in his arguments, he was still largely satisfied
with what the Court had produced. This is a striking fact, the only reasonable
explanation for which is to point to Marshall’s undiminished faith in the power
inherent in the Court’s command. At a press conference in New York soon after
the decision came down, the NAACP released a statement that noted: “We see
nothing in the language of the opinion which sustains the view of some Southern
states that delay in compliance may be of indefinite length.”314 In a private
conversation a few days later, Marshall declared: “The more I think about it, I
think it’s a damned good decision! . . . [T]he laws have got to yield! They’ve got to
yield to the Constitution.”315 “You can say all you want,” he concluded, “but those
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white crackers are going to get tired of having Negro lawyers beating ‘em every
day in court. They’re going to get tired of it.”316
The commitment of the NAACP leadership to this hopeful vision of racial
change was more than just Thurgood Marshall and his colleagues advocating for
their clients. Civil rights leaders of the day not only used racial liberal assumptions
as a tool for forwarding their agenda, they also were committed to—perhaps, in
ways, even seduced by—racial liberal ideology, especially the faith in the power of
legal reform. The entire school desegregation litigation campaign was premised on
a deep commitment to the power of the courts and, more generally, the laws to
shape human behavior. Years later Marshall would recall, “I had thought, we’d all
thought, that once we got the Brown case, the thing was going to be over.”317
Marshall’s colleague Robert Carter would later regret the narrow focus of the
NAACP on attacking de jure segregation rather than focusing on the more basic
concerns of educational opportunity.318 “In a sense, these men were profoundly
naïve,” noted a scholar who worked with the NAACP lawyers.319 “They really felt
that once the legal barriers fell, the whole black-white situation would change.”320
Marshall, in particular, “truly believed in the United States and the Constitution,
but that the whole system was tragically flawed by the segregation laws. Wipe
away those laws and the whole picture would change.”321
Marshall was not alone among the pioneering generation of civil rights
lawyers in his optimistic assessment of the prospects for implementation. As late
as 1957, Judge William H. Hastie, who had helped in the early stages of the
NAACP’s litigation campaign before becoming the first African American
316
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appointed to a federal court of appeals, believed that the battles of civil rights
litigation were all but over. “Son,” he told a young black lawyer interested in
following in his footsteps, “I am afraid that you were born fifteen years too late to
have a career in civil rights.”322 In the immediate aftermath of the Brown decisions,
Marshall’s optimism was more the rule than the exception among the decision’s
supporters.
V. FAITH TESTED: THE ORDEAL OF IMPLEMENTATION AND MASSIVE RESISTANCE
The triumph of Brown was ironically also a new challenge to the premise that
the law could lead the battle against racial prejudice. Court-mandated school
desegregation soon inspired organized resistance—widespread rejection of federal
law—that refuted the ideological heart of racial liberalism. Those who had been
arguing for the past decade that the nation was ready for change and that the
strength of the law would effectively bring outliers in line with national opinion
were not prepared for massive resistance. Thus Brown was at once a triumphant
achievement of the campaign to reenvision the capacity of the law, even as it
became a new point of departure for a powerful reconsideration of the legalist
position. Brown became a contested symbol, claimed by both legalists and skeptics
in their debate over the relationship between law and social reform.
A. Massive Resistance
While the initial Brown decision was accompanied by considerable optimism,
much of this hopefulness dissolved in the years following Brown II. In the face of
massive resistance, “[t]he judicial process had reached the limit of its capacity.”323
While segregationists countered Brown with attempts at legal refutation, by
challenging the Court’s reliance on psychology324 or even going so far as to defend
a state’s right to “interposition,”325 massive resistance, at its most effective, was a
mobilized political and social movement. As explained by one of the attorneys
who argued on behalf of South Carolina before the Court in Brown:
Our only hope, at present, lies not in carrying on the battle in the courts
by the presentation of legal defense, but in taking the battle to the people
and using the same psychological and sociological warfare that has been
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so successfully carried on against us, i.e., the principles of mass
psychology expressed through organized public opinion.326
In essence, the white South hoped to bypass unsupportive legal institutions and
launch a Myrdalian “educational offensive,” only this time with the goal of
bolstering the failing Jim Crow system.
The opening salvo of massive resistance came in the form of a congressional
statement, the so-called “Southern Manifesto” of March 12, 1956, which
denounced the Brown decisions as a “clear abuse of judicial power” that trampled
on “the reserved rights of the states and the people.”327 The separate-but-equal
principle “restated time and again, became a part of the life of the people of many
of the States and confirmed their habits, customs, traditions, and way of life.”328
The Manifesto helped transform scattered discontent and prevalent uncertainty into
a united, even “respectable,” movement, as southern politicians rallied behind their
shared opposition to “forced” integration of schools.329 And in doing so, they also
rallied behind an effort to elevate their commitment to “folkways” against the
“stateways” embodied in the Brown decision. Again, quoting Bickel:
The Supreme Court’s law, the southern leaders realized, could not
in our system prevail—not merely in the very long run, but within the
decade—if it ran counter to deeply felt popular needs or convictions, or
even if it was opposed by a determined and substantial minority and
received with indifference by the rest of the country.330
Of course, many had always resisted the arguments of the racial liberals that
the law of the land would be enough to break apart Jim Crow: some because they
supported segregation as a policy and a practice, some because they retained a
Sumnerian skepticism toward the capacity of the law, some because of a mixture
of the two. But with the white South organized around a commitment to preserving
segregation, critics of racial liberalism’s vision of the capacity of the law, who had
been in retreat, throwing out last-ditch arguments of a position whose time had
passed, now gained a new level of credence and legitimacy. Before massive
resistance, these skeptics might have been dismissed as nothing more than
defenders of the dying cause of Jim Crow. Now some of their claims seemed to
have a ring of truth to them. They seemed to capture, better than the claims of
legalists, what was happening in the nation, as an entire region of the country had
committed itself to refuting the clear mandate of the Supreme Court—and doing so
in the name of local customs and mores.
326
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The most prominent representative of this skeptical position was President
Eisenhower. Eisenhower rejected the racial liberal claims for the capacity of law to
undermine negative racial attitudes. In the aftermath of Brown, he repeatedly
dismissed the idea that law could affect prejudice. “[I]t is difficult through law and
through force to change a man’s heart,” he explained at a 1956 news conference.331
[W]e must all . . . help to bring about a change in spirit so that extremists
on both sides do not defeat what we know is a reasonable, logical
conclusion to this whole affair, which is recognition of equality of men. .
. . This is a question of leadership and training and teaching people, and
it takes some time, unfortunately.332
Eisenhower used this skepticism to justify his tepid public support for federal
involvement in desegregating schools.333 Eisenhower only roused himself to act on
behalf of Brown in the face of a flagrant challenge to federal authority in the Little
Rock Crisis of 1957.334
Eisenhower’s skeptical assessment of the potential of civil rights reform
seemed to many a fair explanation for the limited efficacy of Brown and the
emergence of organized white southern resistance, with its threatening calls for
interposition and nullification. Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic presidential
candidate in 1952 and 1956, who prior to Brown had expressed moderate support
for federal civil rights measures,335 now mirrored Eisenhower’s views on the
relationship between race relations and law. “On civil rights,” historian Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., recorded in his diary following a conversation with Stevenson in
1956,
he kept saying that the basic fact was the difficulty of the adjustment;
that it was raising false hopes to suggest that people’s minds and hearts
could be changed by coercion; that the Negro leaders were defeating
their own purposes when they put on pressure; that the only Negro hope
was to reduce tension and let the moderate-minded southerners assume
331
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local leadership and work out the problems of adjustment in a gradualist
way.336
Leadership on the civil rights issue, Stevenson believed, required the President to
play the role of a “conciliator,” not the imposition of new legal requirements; he
even suggested the idea of calling for “a year moratorium on all further agitation,
legal action, etc. in the civil rights field.”337
Segregationists predictably trotted out the failures of Reconstruction and
Prohibition to demonstrate the futility of legal reforms that ran against entrenched
beliefs and practices. The Attorney General of Virginia, in response to what he
called Thurgood Marshall’s “siren song entitled ‘the People of the South are Lawabiding People,’” told the Court in the oral arguments in Brown II:
Yes, we are an orderly law-abiding people. We lead in giving law and
order to the nation. We washed the Eighteenth Amendment out of the
Constitution and flooded the Volstead Act to oblivion on the stream of
our honest spirits because it affected the way of life of the American
people.338
(To this, Marshall responded that he was “shocked that anybody classes that right
to take a drink of whiskey involved in prohibition with the right of a Negro child to
participate in education.”339) Organized resistance to desegregation expanded
efforts to resurrect the ghosts of Reconstruction and Prohibition. Whites in the
South must “shape their destiny and control their way of life, just as they did in the
far more dangerous period of Reconstruction,” instructed a segregationist editor.340
In the wake of the Little Rock crisis, a law professor at Southern Methodist
University in Texas who supported integration warned that pressing desegregation
too quickly would only lead to more opposition. It was “extremely hard [to change
popular attitudes] overnight by a court decree . . . . The people of the North didn’t
change their habits in regard to drinking promptly because of the 18th
Amendment.”341 One fervent defender of states’ rights and segregation wrote an
open letter to Eisenhower in 1959 condemning his role in the Little Rock
showdown. “To force [desegregation] upon the Southern white will, I think, meet
with as much opposition as the prohibition amendment encountered in the wet
states.”342 Similarly, in making his case against pending civil rights legislation in
1960, Senator William Fulbright referenced the failure of Prohibition, concluding,
336
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“legislation to regulate men’s mores is doomed to failure.”343 Ominous references
to Reconstruction and Prohibition remained a touchstone for critics of federal civil
rights law into the 1960s.
B. The Capacity of the Law Reconsidered
With the strengthening of massive resistance emboldening civil rights
opponents in their dismissal of civil rights law as ineffective or even
counterproductive, racial liberals found their commitment to their optimistic claims
of the pre-Brown period sorely tested. For some supporters of the civil rights
project of the 1950s and 1960s, the experience of implementing school
desegregation, with dramatic victories, frequent disappointments, and practically
no integration in the Deep South for at least a decade following Brown, led to a
more chastened vision of the capacity of the law.
In the aftermath of Brown, more measured assumptions about the role of law
in shaping social behavior gained prominence among legal scholars, historians, and
social psychologists. Within legal academia, perhaps no scholar more thoroughly
and thoughtfully probed the limitations of the law in the decades following Brown
than Alexander Bickel. Bickel’s major contribution was to inject a recognition of
expediency and efficacy of legal change into the judicial formulation of legal
principles.344 The legitimacy of a Supreme Court decision, he argued, derived from
social acceptance of the principle underlying that decision.345 Bickel envisioned a
dialogic relationship—“a continuing colloquy”—between the Court, which
translates fundamental principles into legal commands, and society (represented
most prominently by the elected branches of government).346 This sensitivity to the
need for principled pragmatism in the reformation of the law347 only increased in
subsequent years, as Bickel came to increasingly emphasize tradition and custom
as the basis for legal development.348
C. Vann Woodward’s thesis from The Strange Career of Jim Crow—that the
appearance of Jim Crow laws marked a fundamentally new and more repressive
stage in southern race relations—came under fire as scholars unearthed prejudicial
attitudes and discriminatory practices that thrived without the imprimatur of Jim
Crow laws.349 Woodward would spend much of his career qualifying some of the
343
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more sweeping statements about the role of the law in Strange Career and refuting
its simplistic cooptation.350 As massive resistance took form, he would reconsider
his assertion that the South would follow the Court’s lead.351 The post-Brown
period also saw social psychologists questioning the overly optimistic conclusions
toward the possibility of intergroup contact that had been promoted following
WWII.352
One group particularly shaped by the failed promises of Brown were young
African Americans in the South. They had been told that the Supreme Court had
ended segregation in schools, yet most continued to attend, year after year, the
same separate schools. When they saw the drama of the Little Rock “nine,” the
black students who integrated Central High School under the protection of federal
troops, they saw not the power of the law so much as heroic public defiance in the
face of injustice. Then, in 1960, this generation of African American students
decided to pursue a new approach to achieving racial change, an approach that
would not rely on laws and legal institutions. The student sit-in movement of 1960
was in large part a reaction to the failures of school desegregation and the limited
achievements of civil rights reform. As much as possible, student demonstrators
pushed the law to the side, recognized (without necessarily accepting) the
disjuncture between morality and legality, and worked to change minds more than
laws. Rather than focusing on legal reform, they spoke more of ridding society of
offensive practices that were designed to subjugate and humiliate African
Americans. And the best way to attack these practices was to appeal to the
conscience of whites—not to “force” them to change through legal compulsion,
but to convince them to see the injustice of their way of life.353
Martin Luther King, Jr. immediately grasped the significance of the sit-ins as
an alternative to an NAACP-led project of school desegregation litigation that, by
this point, had stalled in the face of legal delays interspersed with occasional token
efforts at integration. To King, the students were “seeking to dignify the law and to
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affirm the real and positive meaning of the law of the land.”354 In rejecting the
idealistic vision of the law that pervaded the NAACP’s work leading up to
Brown,355 he adopted instead an explanation for the relationship between law and
prejudicial attitudes that balanced an appreciation of the value of legal change with
a call to go beyond just changing laws. “The law tends to declare rights—it does
not deliver them. A catalyst is needed to breathe life experience into a judicial
decision by the persistent exercise of the rights until they become usual and
ordinary in human conduct.”356 King’s vision of social justice demanded not only
legal reform, through recognized institutional channels such as litigation and
lobbying, but also social action, through nonviolent protest. The invaluable
contribution of King to the struggle for racial equality stemmed from his
skepticism toward the efficacy of legal change when it was unaccompanied by
organized social action. His vision resonated in the post-Brown years, when the
limited accomplishments of school desegregation litigation challenged the central
claim of racial liberalism.
VI. CONCLUSION
The political world of make-believe mingles with the real world in
strange ways, for the make-believe world may often mold the real one . . .
. Because fictions are necessary, because we cannot live without them,
we often take pains to prevent their collapse by moving the facts to fit the
fiction, by making our world conform more closely to what we want it to
be. We sometimes call it, quite appropriately, reform or reformation,
when the fiction takes command and reshapes reality.357
The debate over the capacity of the law invariably comes down, at one point
or another, to a leap of faith—it involves, in historian Edmund Morgan’s words, a
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turn to “fiction.”358 The question is simply too indeterminate, with too many
moving parts, too many angles of approach. In a complex society with multiple
levels of governance and a diverse populace, one can always find examples of law
reshaping beliefs and practices, just as one can always find support for the failure
of law to do the same. When evaluating the efficacy of the law during the height of
Jim Crow, for example, one’s conclusions will be sharply different depending on
whether one focuses on Jim Crow legislation in the states (as Woodward did), or
whether one focuses on the failure of the Fourteenth Amendment and federal civil
rights legislation to protect the most basic rights of African Americans—or even
the egregious failure of Plessy to ensure real equality of segregated facilities.
Whether one finds “law” in the Jim Crow era (or any era) effective or not largely
depends on one’s starting assumptions about which laws are most relevant.
Furthermore, modern-day defenders of the capacity of the law have rightly
emphasized the subtle ways in which the law can operate to influence social
interactions or shape consciousness. Even if a legal mandate from the Supreme
Court may have limited direct influence, new legal norms seep into society,
making some options seem more legitimate or feasible, while discouraging
others—and thus affecting (if not necessarily dictating) social practices, customs,
and attitudes.359 Yet even this cultural analysis of the efficacy of law points in
different directions: social historians have demonstrated that oppressed groups
have countless ways to exercise resistance and autonomy, even within oppressive
legal systems.360
In light of these complications, any sweeping generalization of what the law
and the courts can do necessarily slips into a discussion of what the law and the
courts should do. In this case, the descriptive is inherently, insistently normative.
Exaggerated conclusions about the incapacity of the law have always been used to
bolster underlying skepticism toward whether the law should be employed for a
particular end. In the era of Jim Crow, a commitment to white supremacy was
often rationalized through skepticism toward the power of law to challenge social
inequality. And the converse has also held: exaggerated estimates for the capacity
of the law reinforced the positions of those who are already committed to pressing
legal reform through the courts.
The inescapable complexity of the question of what law can accomplish, and
the inevitable normativity of the debate over law’s capacity, were exemplified in
the racial liberalism of the 1940s and 1950s. The legalist position was a powerful
weapon of reform. It was a necessary corrective to the self-serving, status-quo
enforcing skepticism toward the law embodied in the Plessy Court’s dismissal of
358
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laws as powerless to affect “racial instincts.”361 This was a useful, perhaps even
necessary, fiction—a fiction that contained the possibility of creating an
atmosphere in which facts might eventually conform to aspiration, when “the
fiction takes command and reshapes reality.”362 The postwar campaign to promote
the efficacy of civil rights reform helped to open opportunities in the cause of
racial equality that would have been inconceivable to earlier generations. Without
the deeply held optimism toward the capacity of law to release American society
from the fetters of Jim Crow practices and racist beliefs, it is hard to imagine that
the liberal establishment would have accepted civil rights reform, including legally
mandated desegregation, as a necessary part of the public policy landscape of the
day. And without this baseline of support, the Supreme Court would never have
taken their monumental step in Brown.363
Yet, like Myrdal’s claim for the pervasiveness of racial egalitarianism, the
claims of racial liberalism outran reality, contributing to an overly sanguine idea
on the part of activists and judges of what court decisions and other legal changes
could actually accomplish. So while recognizing the unquestionable achievements
of racial legalism, one must also acknowledge that this newfound appreciation for
law’s capacity in the field of race relations had its costs. By promoting
antidiscrimination law as the key to unlocking generations of entrenched social
inequality, legalists shifted attention from other paths toward the goal of racial
justice. The intensive focus on using laws to undermine prejudicial attitudes
deemphasized the structural elements of racial inequality. The inflated optimism
toward the potential of turning the law against discriminatory behavior pulled
energy and resources from efforts to promote equality through economic reform;
advocates of this path often argued for an alliance between the civil rights
movement and the labor movement. The belief that racial justice would come
through structural and economic transformation more than antidiscrimination law
dominated the progressive agenda in the 1930s and early 1940s.364 The subsequent
rise of racial legalism contributed to the marginalization of these arguments.
Finally, another cost of racial legalism was its downgrading of the importance of
on-the-ground struggle, protest, and resistance as a necessary element in creating
the conditions necessary for social change.
Eventually, the claims of racial liberals helped set in motion events that would
fulfill, to a considerable extent, their promises to reshape social norms. In the
process of creating a new ideology of civil rights, racial legalism dramatically
raised expectations for change, and when the majesty of the law failed to deliver
on these promises, disappointment and frustration inspired other avenues of
reform. Thus, the challenge to racial liberal expectations in the wake of Brown was
a critical factor in launching the next stage of the civil rights movement, when the
frontlines of the battle moved from the courtroom to the streets. Postwar racial
361
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liberals were essential, if largely unwitting, forefathers of direct-action protests of
the 1960s, a movement far more skeptical toward the capacity of the law than the
liberal reformers of the previous generation. These protests were driven by the goal
not only of making the law more just—for as the failed promise of Brown had
made clear, this was just an initial step—but of ensuring that legal principles
would be translated into a more just society.

